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Abstract
Trading nations exchange tariff concessions in the context of trade liberalizing
rounds. Tariffs, nonetheless, are not the only instrument affecting the value of a
concession. Domestic instruments affect it as well, but public order is not
negotiable, and, consequently, is not scheduled. Public order is unilaterally
defined, but must respect the default rules concerning allocation of jurisdiction
which are common to all WTO Members and bind them by virtue of their
appurtenance to the international community. In this paper, we focus on the
interaction between trade and environment. The purpose of this study is to
highlight how these rules and the GATT/WTO jointly determine the scope for
unilateral environmental policies for WTO Members. In the study we examine
the relevant multilateral framework dealing with this issue, as well as the
relevant GATT and WTO case‐law. We also briefly present the jurisdictional
default rules in Public International Law. As a means of focusing the discussion,
we consider a series of scenarios, partly building on factual aspects of cases that
have already been brought before the WTO. These scenarios are intended to
isolate issues of specific interest from a policy point of view. For each scenario we
then seek to determine what would the outcome be, in case WTO adjudicating
bodies were to explicitly take account of the default rules concerning allocation of
jurisdiction, something which has not been done to date. Our main conclusions
are two‐fold: on occasion, the outcome would be different, had WTO panels
observed the default rules concerning allocation of jurisdiction; more generally,
the default rules can help us understand the limits of some key obligations
assumed under the WTO. Crucially, absent recourse to the default rules concerning
allocation of jurisdiction, one risks understanding non‐discrimination (the key GATT‐
obligation) as an instrument aimed to harmonize conditions of competition across
markets, and not within markets, as the intent of negotiators has always been.

JEL: F13, F18, F53
Keywords: Trade and environment, WTO
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1

Introduction

The purpose of this study is to provide an overview of the jurisdictional aspects of
the treatment of environmental policies (EP) affecting goods’ trade in the World
Trade Organization (WTO). The allocation of jurisdiction – that is, the allocation
of the right to regulate transactions or activities – is a fundamental ingredient of
law‐making by sovereign states in general.1 Jurisdiction is of particular interest in
the context of unilaterally pursued EP by WTO Members. For example, there is a
vivid policy discussion concerning the situations in which WTO Members have
the right to pursue environmental regulation to address hazards that occur
outside their sovereignty. This is effectively a question concerning jurisdiction.

WTO Members must observe Public International Law (PIL) when pursuing
unilateral environmental policies, that is, both by treaties and by international
custom. The main agreement of interest is of course the WTO Agreement itself,
but other agreements, such as Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs)
could be of relevance as well. The basic principle of the GATT2 and the other
multilateral agreements on trade in goods in the WTO Agreement –known as
Annex 1A agreements– is to allow WTO Members to unilaterally decide on their
domestic policies. EPs are not treated any differently. The GATT imposes
restrictions on unilaterally defined EP through, in particular, the two non‐
discrimination clauses – the Most‐Favoured Nation (MFN) provision and the

Of some interest from the point of view of the WTO Agreement is the fact that not only states have
sovereignty: customs territories can have limited sovereignty, that is, sovereignty over a particular
class of transactions. Hong Kong, China, for example, has sovereignty (also after its accession to
People’s Republic of China) over its international trade relations and thus, participates in the WTO
as a Member.
2 The GATT is the General Agreement Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, one of the agreements
under the aegis of the WTO.
1
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National Treatment (NT) provision – and also through certain other provisions.
WTO Members are also bound by Customary International Law (CIL), that is, the
other (besides agreements) main source of PIL, which binds states by virtue of
their appurtenance to the community of nations.3 4 The basic principle of CIL is
that states are equal partners, and that absent transfer of sovereignty to the
international plane, they are free to exercise jurisdiction to their liking.5 This
principle applies fully in the case of EP. When pursuing unilateral policies, such
as EP, nonetheless, a state might encroach on the sovereignty of another nation if,
for example, a transaction concerns more than one jurisdiction. CIL consists of
rules and principles of general application dealing with the conduct of states,
focusing on the rights and obligations of states inter alia in cases of jurisdictional
conflict between countries. These jurisdictional rules are directly relevant for the
conduct of EP.

The GATT does not include any explicit specification of the permissible
jurisdictional reach of WTO Members’ EP, and, in this sense, it does not explicitly
address the question of which transactions a WTO Member can regulate
unilaterally; it is concerned only with the issue how (that is, the non‐
discriminatory character) EP can be practised. The fact that WTO Members retain
sovereignty over domestic policies, as long as such instruments are not used for
Public International Law covers all sources of international law, custom is one of them and a treaty
is another. One can also distinguish between general and regional customs, but throughout this
paper we use the term as covering both. Formally speaking, countries are also be bound by
derivations from general principles common to the major legal system of the world, but we
disregard this source of law in what follows.
4 Although no specific reference to default rules was made, the WTO Appellate Body (AB) in its
report on US – Gasoline, held that the WTO cannot be construed in clinical isolation from public
international law (p. 17).
5 This is the principle of sovereign equality. States can decide however, deviations from this
principle: one such agreed deviation is the introduction of weighted voting in the International
Monetary Fund (IMF). See infra, our discussion of the Lotus jurisprudence.
3

6

protectionist purposes, permeates the GATT; there is, hence, an implicit notion of
jurisdiction in the agreement. The jurisdictional rules in CIL are primarily
concerned with which transactions or activities a country can regulate, but also
with the manner in which this should be done (that is, they respond, albeit
imperfectly so, to the question what is reasonable exercise of jurisdiction?). In
order for unilateral EP to be lawfully pursued, they must abide by both these sets
of laws.

The text of the WTO Agreement is silent on the nature of the relationship
between WTO Law and the jurisdictional principles in the defaults rules in CIL.
Litigation before the WTO has shed little, if any, light on the role of CIL (with
respect to exercise of jurisdiction) in the WTO‐context. Without explicitly
addressing the issue, GATT/WTO case‐law has implicitly embraced the principle
that WTO Members have the right to regulate the conditions under which they
grant market access, irrespective of adverse effects of such regulation for their
trading partners. The Appellate Body (AB), for example, held that the United
States (US) could lawfully condition access of shrimps to its market on the prior
satisfaction of a production process unilaterally decided by the US government,
notwithstanding the fact that in order to export to the US market, foreign
producers had to conform to a production process which they had not decided
(indeed, which they could hardly influence, and which was contrary to that
decided by their own government).

Why are we concerned with jurisdictional rules concerning unilateral EPs? There
are several reasons for our interest. One is our belief that, in the continuing
absence of a more substantive discussion on the interaction between trade and
environment, WTO Members will increasingly dispute the right of their trading
7

partners to regulate particular transactions, through recourse to PIL. Indeed,
steps in this direction were already taken in the US – Tuna, and US – Shrimp
litigations, where such arguments were made by the complainants.6

Second, jurisdictional rules are central for the effectiveness of any trade
agreement. To demonstrate why this is the case, we will employ a highly stylized
example, in which we will compare three different legal settings. Consider a
world consisting of two countries that can trade. Each government has access to
one type of domestic policy instrument, taxes, and to one trade instrument,
tariffs. Taxes can only be levied on economic activities, such as production, sales,
and consumption of goods. Tax policies are perfectly enforceable, so any tax that
is levied can also be collected without administrative costs, regardless of where
the activity occurs. When setting its policies, each government is only concerned
with the interests of its nationals.

(i)

Assume, first, that there are absolutely no jurisdictional restrictions on

permissible policies. The exact tax/tariff schemes that the countries would choose
in the absence of any form of policy coordination with other countries, would
depend on the details of the situation. But since governments have the possibility
to tax any activity occurring in this hypothetical world, they would typically find
it profitable to tax foreign as well as domestic activities. What is clear is that,
since the governments often disregard foreign interests when deciding on their
tax schemes, the possibility of taxing foreign activities would introduce beggar‐
thy‐neighbour‐like features in the tax schemes. An agreement binding border
instruments would in all likelihood have no impact at all, absent jurisdictional

6

As we will see, infra, though, panels have not reacted head on to such arguments.
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rules: in this world, there would be no need to use trade instruments, since the
possibility to tax foreign activities directly offers a more attractive means for
beggar‐thy‐neighbour behaviour.

(ii)

Suppose next that the agreement on tariffs is coupled with a National

Treatment‐like provision that restricts tax treatment of products in the domestic
territory. It is hard, in general, to say whether such an agreement would have
any impact at all. But the possibility would still remain to tax activities taking place
in the foreign economy. As a result, very little, if anything, would be achieved
through this agreement.

(iii)

As a final case, suppose instead that the agreement on tariffs and quotas is

coupled with a jurisdictional rule, prohibiting taxation of activities in the foreign
country. In contrast to the previous two examples, this agreement is likely to
have some impact. Note however, that the “trade part” of this agreement is
immaterial, since the outcome is likely to be the same even if the bindings of the
trade instruments were omitted. This will be the case, since, absent restrictions
on domestic policies, the importing country can use production subsidies and
consumption taxes to mimic trade barriers.7 In order to ensure that an agreed
tariff reduction is meaningful, it must thus, at the very least, be accompanied by
some form of restriction on the use of domestic policies.

The point we want to make through this abstract reasoning is that the GATT must
be supported by jurisdictional rules in order to have any impact.

For instance, a production subsidy (which is a negative tax) and a consumption tax of equal
magnitude (levied on the domestic as well as the imported product) can do a perfect job of
mimicking a tariff of this magnitude.
7
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A third reason for our interest in jurisdictional rules is our suspicion that the
current allocation of jurisdiction is likely to be inefficient from an economic point
of view. This suspicion stems from a combination of two factors. First, unilateral
decisions are likely to take into consideration the consequences for national or
government interests only. Second, the costs and benefits of regulation are likely
to be unevenly spread across countries. Hence, unilateral decisions on EP will not
appropriately balance their global costs and benefits. Both the trade regulation
and the default rules can be seen as attempts to address the problems stemming
from unilateralism. But these regimes are likely to only partially remedy the
problems. Furthermore, it seems reasonable to guess a priori that each regime
may also introduce inefficiencies due to their rigid nature, and furthermore that
these inefficiencies may interact, sometimes counteracting each other, sometimes
reinforcing each other. By distilling the core features of the existing legal regime,
the present study may serve as a stepping stone for more detailed studies of how
the current jurisdictional rules affect environmental policies, and how they
should be redesigned.

Section 2 discusses in some detail the law and case‐law concerning the
jurisdictional ambit of unilaterally defined EP in the GATT, and Section 3
reviews the two other Annex 1A agreements of importance to this paper, namely,
the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), and the Agreement on the
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS). Section 4 presents the
default rules in CIL. Sections 5‐10 consider a series of stylized scenarios involving
the treatment of EP under the WTO. For each scenario we first discuss what we
believe a typical GATT panel – a panel that effectively disregards the default rules
– would conclude concerning the legality of the discussed policy. We then try to
10

determine whether an invocation of the default rules would make a difference to
the outcome. The hope is that these scenarios will highlight important aspects of
jurisdiction in “archetype” situations with regard to EP. Section 11 summarizes
our main findings, and briefly discusses some their implications.

2

The GATT Discipline on Environmental Policies

2.1

The Regulatory Framework

A central feature of the GATT is that it binds trade instruments: for instance,
WTO Members have to respect the tariff concessions that they offered in the
previous round; they are not allowed to use quantitative import or export
restrictions; nor are they allowed to subsidize exports. The GATT leaves
discretion, nonetheless, over internal (domestic) instruments to its WTO
Members, although they are not entirely free to determine them to their liking:
they must, in particular, respect the MFN provision (Art. I GATT), and the NT
provision in Art. III GATT. Art. I GATT requests of each WTO Member not to
treat the products originating in one WTO Member differently than the “like”
products originating in any other WTO Member, both with respect to trade, as
well as domestic instruments. Any trade advantage granted to the products of
one WTO Member, must be accorded “immediately and unconditionally” to the
“like” products originating in any other WTO Member. WTO Members must, by
virtue of the legal discipline in Art. III GATT, avoid treating imported goods “so
as to afford protection” to domestic “like” goods. Art. III GATT covers all fiscal
instruments, as well as internal laws, regulations and requirements of non‐fiscal
nature that “affect” the life of imported products in a given market: a WTO

11

Member can, for example, unilaterally define its EP, but must apply it in a non‐
discriminatory manner (over all imported and domestic “like goods), to the
extent that its EP affects trade in goods.8 The GATT is, in this sense, a “negative
integration” scheme, since no common policies (EP as well) are established that
all WTO Members should follow: the GATT states what is not allowed to be
pursued through EP (discrimination), rather than what should be done.9

The GATT also contains in Art. XX GATT a loophole out of (at least formally) any
other provision in the agreement, provided it is to achieve certain objectives
included in this list. The list is exhaustive: WTO Members cannot, for example,
through recourse to Art. XX GATT, address commercial externalities arising
from low environmental standards in the exporting country, since such an
objective does not figure in the body of Art. XX GATT. For a measure coming
under the purview of this provision to be GATT‐inconsistent, it must further not
amount to “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination and/or a disguised
restriction of trade”. Standing WTO case‐law has made it clear that the WTO
judge will review only the means used and not the ends pursued (provided of
course, that the ends pursued figure in the list of Art. XX GATT).10 The test for
legal consistency differs depending on the objective sought. The measure has to
be “necessary” in order to achieve some of the listed policy objectives, and it can
simply relate to the protection of others.

How do EP fit into this? As long as WTO Members, when pursuing EP, use a
domestic instrument, their practice will come under the ambit of both Arts. I and

9

The only significant exception is the TRIPs.
For confirmation, see the very recent AB report on Brazil – Retreaded Tyres.

10
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III GATT. To the extent that a trade instrument has been used, it is Art. I GATT
only that is legally relevant. Note, however, that none of these provisions
explicitly refers to EP. Importantly, the Interpretative Note ad Art. III GATT
stipulates that domestic measures enforced at the border come under the
purview of Art. III GATT (and not that of Art. XI GATT which deals with import
and export quotas and does not contain a discrimination‐test): thus, a sales ban
which is enforced at the border and could, consequently, be mistaken for trade
embargo will still be considered to be a domestic sales ban (and, consequently,
come under the purview of Art. III GATT).11 We quote:

Any internal tax or other internal charge, or any law, regulation or requirement
of the kind referred to in paragraph 1 which applies to an imported product and
to the like domestic product and is collected or enforced in the case of the
imported product at the time or point of importation, is nevertheless to be
regarded as an internal tax or other internal charge, or a law, regulation or
requirement of the kind referred to in paragraph 1, and is accordingly subject to
the provision of Article III.

The General Exceptions clause (Art. XX GATT) contains language that more
directly address EP: Art. XX(b) GATT refers to animal and plant life or health,
whereas Art. XX(g) GATT refers to the protection of exhaustible natural resources.
Also, environment might possibly also come under Art. XX(a) GATT, which
refers to “public morals”.

Now, this raises this question whether it is for the GATT (in a centralized manner) or individual
WTO Members to decide whether an instrument is trade or domestic. Mavroidis (2007) explains
why this issue is moot.
11
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2.2 The Jurisdictional Ambit of Unilateral Environmental
Policies in Case‐law
The GATT is from an economic point of view a highly “incomplete” agreement,
in a number of ways. For instance, it only directly binds trade instruments, but
leaves domestic instruments unbound (except for imposing the obligation not to
discriminate on them). The regulation of domestic instruments is unclear because
of the vagueness of notions such as “like” and “affecting”. Also, the exact nature
of the loophole in Art. XX GATT is unclear. Because of this incompleteness,
conflicts may arise over obligations that are implicitly or vaguely specified. As a
consequence, adjudication plays an important role for the interpretation of the
agreement.12 We will in the rest of this section portray core features of the case‐
law treatment of the GATT disciplines on environmental policies, and in
particular how it has addressed, or perhaps better, avoided to address central
jurisdictional issues.

2.2.1 The GATT Case‐law
(a)

US – Canadian Tuna

This dispute, which is the closest we have gotten to discus jurisdictional issues in
the GATT/WTO dispute settlement practice, has been surprisingly overlooked in
literature. The facts are as follows: Canadian authorities seized US vessels and
arrested US fishermen who were fishing within the 200 miles of the Canadian
coast.13 In response, the US government, as per Section 205 of the US Fishery

See the analysis along these lines, in Horn and Mavroidis (2004). For a formal explanation see
Horn, Maggi and Staiger (2007).
13 According to customary international law, codified in the Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS III), the 200 miles‐zone signals the exclusive economic zone that foreign countries cannot
exploit without the consent of the coastal state having right to it.
12
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Conservation & Management Act (1976), blocked all imports of Canadian albacore
tuna into its market. Canada and the US consulted, without success and Canada
submitted their dispute to a panel. Subsequently, they reached an agreement
whereby the US government agreed to lift the embargo. The Canadian
government, nonetheless, did not wish to suspend the panel’s proceedings: in its
view, the very existence of Section 205 constituted enough of a threat that similar
behaviour could be repeated in the future; it thus requested the Panel to continue
its proceedings and judge whether the US measure based on Section 205 was not
GATT‐inconsistent.14

The Canadian claim was that the US measure violated, inter alia, Art. XI GATT.
The US government sought to justify its measure by invoking Art. XX(g) GATT,
arguing that its measures sought to conserve an exhaustible natural resource.
Canada did not dispute that tuna was an exhaustible natural resource, but
argued that the US measures at hand had not been aiming at conserving tuna;
they were rather meant to be a response to the seizure of US fishing boats by
Canadian authorities, since the US government and another (un‐named) state
were the only two states which did not recognize the 200 miles Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ) that every other nation member of the UN‐system
recognized as conferring exclusive economic rights to the coastal state.

On paper, it seems that this panel would unavoidably have been led to address
the jurisdictional issue, that is, whether the GATT allows a country to regulate a
common resource outside its border. Yet it declined to do so. It found the US

The Panel should have adjudicated this as an as such claim, that is, as a claim against the US
statute itself, and not against the measure that it gave rise to, since the measure ceased to exist
before the Panel was established.
14
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measure to be in violation of Art. XX(g) GATT, since the US government had
taken no accompanying measures aiming at restricting the fishing of albacore
tuna by US fishermen. The Panel emphasized that its findings were meant to
address the trade issue only, and that they should not be understood as an
attempt to discuss the fisheries issue (which also involve a jurisdictional issue) as
well:

Finally, the Panel would stress that its findings and conclusions were relevant only
for the trade aspects of the matter under dispute and were not intended to have
any bearing whatsoever on other aspects including those concerning questions of
fishery jurisdiction. (§ 4.16)

(b)

US – Tuna (Mexico)

In this case, the US banned imports of tuna originating in Mexico, because its
production process did not conform to the US process: by not using special
(purse seine) nets, Mexican fishermen were accidentally taking the life of, for US
standards, an unacceptably large number of dolphins.

The jurisdictional issue here could be described as follows: through its regulation
of the conditions of sale for tuna to its own market, the US government imposed
a production process requirement not only on domestic fishermen, but also on
Mexican fishermen. The US was hence de facto regulating a production process
that Mexican fishermen had to comply with, if they wanted to export to the US
market.

16

Mexico did not attack the right of the US government to regulate this transaction.
It challenged the consistency of the US measure with Art. XI GATT, since the US
imposed an import ban. The US government did not present any arguments to
rebut the claim that Art. XI GATT had been violated; instead, it sought
justification of its measures under Art. XX(b) GATT, which allows WTO
Members to justify violations of the GATT, if they can demonstrate that their
measure is necessary to protect human, animal, plant life or health.

The Panel did not put into question the need, as perceived by the US
government, to regulate the fishing of tuna in order to save dolphins’ life. The
Panel rejected, nonetheless, the particular way in which the fishing regulation
was done: in the Panel’s view, the US government had no basis to act unilaterally
in this context. In the Panel’s thinking, were WTO Members to be allowed to act
unilaterally, the result would be a world where a plethora of national regulations
would make it quite onerous to trade. Hence, in this Panel’s view, any
unilaterally defined EP is GATT‐inconsistent, precisely because it has been
unilaterally (as opposed to multilaterally) defined.

(c) US – Tuna (EEC)
The facts of this case are strikingly similar to those in US – Tuna (Mexico). The
only difference was that in this case, the US measure was applied to intermediary
nations that were importing only to re‐export tuna fished in an environmentally‐
unfriendly manner. The European Community (EC) and the Netherlands (on
behalf of the Netherlands Antilles) challenged the consistency of the US measure
and prevailed on the same grounds as Mexico did in the case mentioned
immediately supra.

17

2.2.2 The WTO Case‐law
We will distinguish between cases which directly disputes over the use of EP,
and cases which concern disputes over the use of domestic instruments other
than EP; since, however, all domestic instruments (environmental included)
come under the same legal discipline (Art. III GATT), the WTO jurisprudence
under this provision is at least potentially relevant for environmental disputes.
Four cases come under the former class: US – Gasoline, US – Shrimp, EC –
Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, and Brazil – Re‐treaded Tyres.

(a)

US – Gasoline

This case concerned a US measure which provided for different methodologies to
be applied to domestic and foreign products in order to calculate the
composition and emission effects of gasoline products sold in the US market. The
US alleged that the rationale for the law was the protection of environment. The
Panel and the AB first determined that EP come under the ambit of Art. III GATT
(more recently, the panel report on EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech
Products confirmed this view.) They then found the measure to be inconsistent
with the GATT because of its discriminatory aspect (different methodologies),
and that it could not be justified through recourse to Art. XX GATT: in the AB’s
view, the measure at hand amounted to a disguised restriction of trade. The AB
also held that the US failed to consider the costs for the complainants to comply
with the regulation, and that it should have sought a bargaining solution, instead
of unilaterally imposing its policies in this context.

The jurisdictional issue could be described as follows: the US maintained that it
had the right to regulate the conditions under which gasoline products would be

18

sold within its territory, since, environmental externalities in the production of
gasoline products abroad could affect its territory as well, assuming the said
externalities were of trans‐boundary nature. The US thus exercised its
prescriptive jurisdiction to this effect. The complainants argued that the US
legislation was discriminatory in that it was introducing two different baselines
to calculate the pollution created by activities undertaken domestically, and in
the foreign territory. The complainants prevailed under Art. III GATT. Neither
the Panel nor the AB addressed the jurisdictional issue at all. The AB,
nonetheless, emphasized the relevance of PIL for adjudication in the WTO.

(b)

US – Shrimp

The facts in this case are strikingly similar to those in US – Tuna (Mexico); the
difference is that the products concerned were shrimps and sea turtles, instead of
tuna and dolphins.15 The US government adopted a statute whereby, sales of
shrimps in the US market were conditioned upon the prior demonstration that a
particular production process had been followed, which restricted the number of
sea turtles that were accidentally being caught.16

The jurisdictional issue is the same as in US – Tuna (Mexico): the US government
was regulating access to its territory (market) only, but imposed obligations on
two sets of nationals, domestic and foreign, effectively regulating a production

See Howse and Neven (2007) for an economic‐cum‐legal of core features of this dispute, and
Howse and Regan (2000), and Howse (2002), for discussion of e.g. jurisdictional aspects.
16 The US fishermen were using turtle excluding devices (TEDs), a rather cheap device that allows
sea turtles to swim out, in case they are caught. Initially, the US government requested that all
foreign traders wishing to sell to the US market should demonstrate that their traded shrimps were
fished using TEDs. Following multilateral rulings to this effect, the US government then accepted
that not only TEDs, but any device of comparable efficiency, could be legitimately employed.
15
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process that foreigners had to observe, assuming interest to export to the US
market.

The Panel and the AB reached opposite conclusions on the substance of the
dispute. We will reflect only the latter, since the AB has the legal power to
overturn panels’ findings.17 The AB decision is a sea change when viewed against
the background of the panel report on US – Tuna (Mexico): in an oft‐quoted
passage, reproduced hereinafter, the AB held that the US government had the
right to unilaterally define its EP, provided that it observed the statutory
requirements reflected in the GATT (in this occasion, the requirements
embedded in Art. XX(g) GATT, that is, that the challenged measure was relating
to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources, and was applied in a non‐
discriminatory manner). In other words, in the absence of transfer of sovereignty
to the international plane, WTO Members remained free to unilaterally regulate
their market, provided that they respect the relevant GATT disciplines (§ 121):

… conditioning access to a Memberʹs domestic market on whether exporting
Members comply with, or adopt, a policy or policies unilaterally prescribed by
the importing Member may, to some degree, be a common aspect of measures
falling within the scope of one or another of the exceptions (a) to (j) of Article XX.
Paragraphs (a) to (j) comprise measures that are recognized as exceptions to
substantive obligations established in the GATT 1994, because the domestic
policies embodied in such measures have been recognized as important and
legitimate in character.

It is not necessary to assume that requiring from

exporting countries compliance with, or adoption of, certain policies (although

See Art. 17.13 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
(DSU).
17
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covered in principle by one or another of the exceptions) prescribed by the
importing country, renders a measure a priori incapable of justification under
Article XX.

Such an interpretation renders most, if not all, of the specific

exceptions of Article XX inutile, a result abhorrent to the principles of
interpretation we are bound to apply. (italics and emphasis in the original).

This case‐law has been consistently re‐produced ever since.18 As a result, it is now
uncontested, as a matter of jurisprudential finding, that Art. XX GATT condones
regulatory diversity.

Having established the right of the US government to regulate this transaction in
a unilateral manner, the AB went on to find that, while the US measure was
necessary in the sense of Art. XX GATT, it was being applied in a discriminatory
manner, and, thus, violated the chapeau of this provision. Following corrective
measures, the US government was eventually exonerated from all liability under
the multilateral rules.

Note that the AB did not pronounce, yet again, on the permissibility of the
jurisdictional reach of the US measure: in the absence of a claim, the AB did not
ex officio examine this issue either. The reason why this issue did not come up,
was probably due to the fact that the measure was allegedly designed to protect
sea turtles which migrate through US waters, so US territory was in this sense
directly affected by the killing of the turtles. There was some discussion to this
effect in the AB report, where the AB explained its view on the “sufficient nexus”
between domestic and international environment. We quote §§ 133‐4:
18

See, for example, US – Shrimp (Art. 21.5 – Malaysia) in §§ 137 – 138.
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Finally, we observe that sea turtles are highly migratory animals, passing in and
out of waters subject to the rights of jurisdiction of various coastal states and the
high seas. In the Panel Report, the Panel said:
… Information brought to the attention of the Panel,
including documented statements from the experts, tends
to confirm the fact that sea turtles, in certain circumstances of
their lives, migrate through the waters of several countries and
the high sea. …(footnote omitted by authors, emphasis
added by AB)
The sea turtle species here at stake, i.e., covered by Section 609, are all known to
occur in waters over which the United States exercises jurisdiction.(footnote
omitted) Of course, it is not claimed that all populations of these species migrate
to, or traverse, at one time or another, waters subject to United States jurisdiction.
Neither the appellant nor any of the appellees claims any rights of exclusive
ownership over the sea turtles, at least not while they are swimming freely in
their natural habitat ‐‐ the oceans. We do not pass upon the question of whether
there is an implied jurisdictional limitation in Article XX(g), and if so, the nature
or extent of that limitation. We note only that in the specific circumstances of the
case before us, there is a sufficient nexus between the migratory and endangered
marine populations involved and the United States for purposes of Article XX(g).
(emphasis in original)
For all the foregoing reasons, we find that the sea turtles here involved constitute
ʺexhaustible natural resourcesʺ for purposes of Article XX(g) of the GATT 1994..

Unfortunately, the AB did not elaborate any further and, consequently, the legal
implications of this important passage are not entirely clear. One possible
reading of this discussion, a reading that has been quite common in the
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literature, is that the AB here effectively held that the killing of sea turtles by e.g.
Malaysian fishermen of shrimp physically affected the US environment, by
reducing the turtle population in the US. However, while this is perhaps the
most plausible reading, it should be noted that there is no explicit statement by
the AB to this effect. Also, it is not clear whether the “nexus” is a necessary
condition for Art. XX GATT to be applicable.

(c)

EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products

Of interest to our paper are two issues treated by the panel: the fact that the
panel report confirmed that EP come under the ambit of Art. III GATT, and the
treatment of multilateral trade agreements (MEAs). With respect to the first
question, the issue before the Panel was whether the EC‐regime for approval of
genetically modified organisms (GMOs) was consistent with a number of GATT
and SPS provisions. The EC had argued that its system of approval was, inter alia,
necessary to protect environment. The panel confirmed that EP can come under
the purview of Art. III GATT.

With respect to the second question, the EC had argued that its challenged
measures were fully justified by the Cartagena Protocol on Bio‐safety, an
instrument which had been ratified by 142 states. The Panel took the view that
since the instrument at hand had not been ratified by all WTO Members, it was
legally irrelevant for the purposes of the litigation before it. In other words, the
Panel did not exclude that an MEA might be legally relevant in future litigation;
for this to be the case though, it must be ratified by all WTO Members.
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This report was not appealed, so the AB had no opportunity to pronounce on
this score.19

(d)

Brazil – Re‐treaded Tyres

This is the most recent case dealing with EP. Brazil imposed an import embargo
on re‐treaded, but not on new tyres. The argument for the differential treatment
was that re‐treaded tyres have a shorter life‐span than new tyres and,
consequently, represent more of an environmental concern. On the other hand,
the embargo on re‐treaded tyres was not non‐discriminatory: Brazil did accept,
however, some re‐treaded tyres from its MERCOSUR partners, as well as from
other trading partners, following some Brazilian court decisions to this effect.

The Panel condemned Brazil since its EP did not respect the chapeau of Art. XX
GATT, holding that the Brazilian measure amounted to a disguised restriction of
trade (and thus, violated the requirements of the chapeau of Art. XX GATT). The
AB, while modifying some of the conclusions, essentially upheld this finding.
But neither the Panel, nor the AB discussed the permissibility of the jurisdictional
reach of the Brazilian EP. This is less of a concern compared to other cases
however, since the environmental externality that Brazil claimed to be regulating
would be borne, in all likelihood, by Brazil alone.

We now turn to the cases dealing with other than EP domestic instruments.

(e)

EC – Asbestos

Mavroidis (2008) however, looking at the manner in which WTO adjudicating bodies have been
looking on extra‐WTO law, takes a pessimistic view on this score, arguing that the overall record of
the AB shows a tendency to close the door to extra‐WTO law rather than to open it.

19
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Based on scientific evidence, France enacted legislation banning sales of asbestos
containing‐construction material into its market. Canada challenged the
consistency of the measure with Art. III GATT; in its view, asbestos‐containing
and asbestos‐free construction material should be awarded the same regulatory
treatment since they are like products.

The Panel agreed with Canada that the contested measure violated Art. III
GATT, but exonerated it under Art. XX GATT for being necessary to protect
human life. The AB overturned the Panel’s findings and held that France’s
measures were consistent with Art. III GATT: in its view, consumers would, if
presented with a choice between the two types of products, not view them as
like, due to the health hazard that the asbestos‐containing product gave rise to.
Since the two products were unlike, there could be no violation of Art. III
GATT.20

The EC – Asbestos determination raises several difficult issues with regard to the
role of consumer preferences for the definition of likeness. Without going into
any detail, let us just point to a couple of these. A first issue is the notion of a
“reasonable consumer”, who is by construction a fictitious person who is
endowed with what the AB sees as “reasonable” preferences.21 It goes without
saying that the AB approach is a subjective exercise, in particular as long as the
preferences of actual consumers are not investigated.

See Horn and Weiler (2007a) for a critical discussion, not of the outcome of the dispute, but of the
adjudicating bodies’ reasoning to get there.
21 In many civil law countries a similar construction exists.
20
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A second issue is the question concerning whether the perceived differences in
products have to be reflected in the physical properties of the product. In this
dispute, this was not an issue in the sense that the riskiness of the product was
intimately associated with its physical properties. Some observers have
interpreted the EC – Asbestos ruling to open the door to a wider interpretation
whereby consumer preferences are decisive, regardless of whether the perceived
differences are reflected in the physical properties of the product.22

The EC – Asbestos determination also raises the question of whether consumer
perceptions as such suffice as grounds for differential policy treatment? For
instance, would products be unlike in a legal sense even if consumer perceptions
are erroneous? As things stand, we do not know what the response to this
question is. But our guess is that the AB would not lightheartedly accept
consumer perceptions it believes are erroneous: in EC – Asbestos the AB did not
use surveys of EC consumer perceptions of the particular product; it adopted a
“reasonable consumer” perspective, inferring how such a consumer would treat
the two products.23

The jurisdictional issue in EC – Asbestos could be described as follows: France, by
imposing the sales ban on asbestos containing construction material, regulates
the effect of the consumption of such material in its domestic market. At the same
time, it indirectly regulates the production in Canada, forcing Canadian
producers to reduce or re‐direct some of their production. To see that there is a
jurisdictional issue involved here, note that France could have achieved the same
It seems likely that consumer preferences are less decisive in cases adjudicated under the SPS
Agreement.
23 It should be noted, nonetheless, that the AB did not have any empirical evidence before it. It
should also be noted that it requested none.
22
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(or at least a similar) outcome by regulating production in Canada rather than
consumption in France. Since economically the outcomes are about the same, and
the regulation of Canadian producers clearly involves a jurisdictional issue, so
does implicitly also the regulation of consumption in France. Yet, once again, in
the absence of specific claims to this effect, neither the Panel nor the AB explicitly
addressed the jurisdictional issue.

(f)

EC – Tariff Preferences

The EC provided Pakistani textiles exports with preferences additional to those
granted to Indian exporters under its Generalized System of Preferences (GSP).
Overruling the Panel, the AB, found nothing wrong with the EC scheme,
provided that it was relying on objective criteria. The term objective criteria was not
defined by the AB.24 To this effect, the EC had to effect modifications in its
scheme which, when challenged by India, did not provide for access to any
developing country which would satisfy its criteria, but granted extra
preferences to a closed list of beneficiaries.

Of interest to this study is the fact that the EC scheme provided Pakistan with
extra preferences by following a policy that the EC had determined; Pakistan did
this by enacting decrees to combat the production and trafficking of drugs. By
the same token, one could imagine that the EC could grant preferences, were
Pakistan (or any other beneficiary) to adopt an EP to the liking of the EC.
Although the term objective criteria was not defined by the AB, it should cover
situations which are not linked to one particular country; hence, the insistence of
the AB that the EC removes the close list of beneficiaries.

24

Grossman and Sykes (2005) as well deplore that the AB did not interpret any further this term.
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The AB thus accepted that a WTO Member can provide preferences to another
(developing) WTO Member, if the latter adopts policies that can rely on objective
criteria, irrespective of the effect of such policies on the donor.

2.2.3 Summarizing the WTO Case‐law

We could classify the cases discussed above in three different categories:

(a) Cases where a WTO Member aims at redressing a situation that will occur
in its market if importation occurs (a local consumption hazard): EC –
Asbestos, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, Brazil – Retreaded
Tyres;
(b) Cases where a WTO Member aims at redressing a situation that has
occurred outside its territory, that is, in the territory of the exporting state,
but which affects it (a trans‐boundary production externality): US – Tuna
(Mexico), US – Tuna (EEC), US – Canadian Tuna, US – Shrimp, US ‐ Gasoline;
(c) Cases where a WTO Member aims at redressing a situation that, prima
facie at least, is not linked to either a production or a consumption
externality: in this vein, a WTO Member aims at compensating those
trading partners that adopt sound, in its view, policies by contributing
(through preferential tariffs) to the costs that such policies might entail: EC
– Tariff Preferences.

In neither of the cases presented above did the complainant raise any
jurisdictional claims. In the absence of specific claims to this effect, panels did not
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address this issue either: at least implicitly, they accepted that when the WTO
Member was regulating access to its market, it was lawfully exercising
jurisdiction. The GATT panel on US – Canadian Tuna took a more cautious
approach on this score and, as we saw supra, clarified that its findings were
limited to the trade issue, and that it was not aiming to prejudge at all the
fisheries (jurisdictional) issue.

The paucity of claims from disputing parties concerning jurisdiction naturally
raises the question whether panels could not examine the jurisdictional reach of a
WTO Member’s measures ex officio, that is, even in the absence of a specific claim
to this effect? This issue is, for all practical purposes, water under the bridge.
WTO panels, for a number of reasons linked to their half‐legalistic, half‐
diplomatic nature, are not keen in addressing issues that have not been explicitly
referred to them. There are good legal arguments to support the WTO panels’
attitude. We deem it warranted to make a small detour to WTO case‐law in order
to explain the panels’ attitude in this respect. In what follows, we will try to
show that:

(a) Panels have the competence to ex officio review which claims are properly
before them;
(b) Were they to entertain claims not properly submitted to them, panels
would be violating their obligation under Art. 11 DSU, which requests of
panels to make an objective assessment of only the dispute before them
(the non ultra petita maxim).

Any adjudicating body has, of course, discretion to review ex officio the extent of
its own competence. This means, that adjudicating bodies have competence to
29

verify, on their own initiative, the ambit of claims properly before them. This
much has already been accepted by WTO adjudicating bodies, and is now part of
the WTO legal order: the AB underscored this point in its report on EC – Bananas,
where it held (§ 142):
We recognize that a panel request will usually be approved automatically at the
DSB meeting following the meeting at which the request first appears on the
DSBʹs agenda. As a panel request is normally not subjected to detailed scrutiny
by the DSB, it is incumbent upon a panel to examine the request for the
establishment of the panel very carefully to ensure its compliance with both the
letter and the spirit of Article 6.2 of the DSU.

In its report on Mexico – Corn Syrup (Art. 21.5 – US), the AB went one step further
and argued that panels must (as opposed to should) address the issue of their own
competence (§ 36):

… panels have to address and dispose of certain issues of a fundamental nature,
even if the parties to the dispute remain silent on those issues. In this regard, we
have previously observed that [t]he vesting of jurisdiction in a panel is a
fundamental prerequisite for lawful panel proceedings. For this reason, panels
cannot simply ignore issues which go to the root of their jurisdiction – that is, to
their authority to deal with and dispose of matters. Rather, panels must deal
with such issues – if necessary, on their own motion – in order to satisfy
themselves that they have authority to proceed.
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The issue whether a panel is competent to adjudicate a specific dispute is
eminently of legal nature. Consequently, it is subject to review by the AB. At the
same time, when reviewing which claims are properly before it, a panel may
eliminate a claim, but it cannot add to the claims that the complainant has
submitted; this is in essence what the legal maxim non ultra petita amounts to.
Whereas a judge is, of course, free to use its own arguments to reach a conclusion
(that is, a judge is not bound by the arguments submitted by the parties to a
dispute), a judge cannot make claims for either party. The AB clearly stated
relevance of this principle for WTO panels in its report on Mexico – Corn Syrup
(Article 21.5 – US):

… as a matter of due process, and the proper exercise of the judicial function,
panels are required to address issues that are put before them by the parties to a
dispute. (§ 36)

By the same token, in its report on US – Certain EC Products the AB reversed the
panel’s findings on issues which had not been put properly before it. In the case
at hand, the complainant had not presented any claims under Art. 23.2(a) DSU
and this omission notwithstanding, the panel went on and pronounced on the
consistency of the defendant’s actions with the mentioned legal basis. The
panel’s findings in this respect were reversed (§115). In Chile – Price Band, the AB
went one step further and held that ultra petita rulings constitute a violation of
the panel’s most fundamental duty, that is, to make an objective assessment of
the matter before it (Art. 11 DSU). The only exception to non ultra petita is the
competence of a panel (and the AB, of course) to review its own competence to
adjudicate a particular dispute.
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To conclude, in the absence of any claims as to the jurisdictional reach of national
measures, it is only natural that WTO adjudicating bodies refrained from
expressing any views on this issue.25

3

The TBT/SPS Agreements

Environment‐related disputes may also arise under the Agreement on Technical
Barriers to Trade (TBT), and the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures (SPS). These two agreements innovate compared to Art.
III GATT: SPS incorporates more elaborate tests to detect protectionist intent. The
SPS Agreement includes a series of proxies, such as scientific evidence, coherence
in the formulation of policies, and adherence to international standards, which
aim to distinguish beggar‐thy‐neighbour behaviour from policies genuinely
aiming at protecting health/environment; the TBT Agreement addes necessity to
non‐discrimination. Depending on how the non‐discrimination obligation is
construed, the SPS Agreement outlaws beggar thy neighbour policies in addition
to those outlawed by the GATT. It all depends on the understanding of the
consistency‐requirement embedded in Art. 5.5 SPS: if it is construed as covering
substitutable products only, then there is no difference across the two
agreements; if, conversely, it is construed à la Australia – Salmon to cover any

The absence of claims regarding the jurisdictional reach is arguably due to the fact that there is an
implicit understanding across trading partners to respect the default rules regarding jurisdictional
allocation. Differences persist because the rules are unclear at the margins, as we will try to show
infra. It is only rational that interested states aim to resolve such differences through direct
negotiations, rather than submitting disputes to WTO panels with no (demonstrable) expertise on
jurisdictional allocation. Such issues are the hard core of sovereignty and it is only normal that
states are quite risk averse when dealing with them.
25
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situation where there are comparable health risks, then the SPS Agreement will
be exerting a de‐regulatory function that the GATT does not.26

In other respects, the two agreements follow the GATT‐logic. Sometimes, one
finds in the literature the view that the TBT and SPS Agreements are “positive
integration” instruments, requesting countries to adopt certain domestic
measures. In support of this claim it is frequently held that these agreements
require WTO Members to adopt international standards. This view should be
discarded: WTO Members do not have to enact international standards
irrespective whether they want to intervene in a particular field. They will have to
base their intervention on such standards, only after they have decided to
intervene. This latter decision is sovereign, and not a matter of legal compulsion:
WTO Members which do not want, for example, to enact legislation regarding
the safety of children’s toys, do not have to adopt the relevant ISO standards.

To the extent countries adhere to international standards, the discussion
concerning jurisdiction should become irrelevant, since these standards reflect
international agreements. Case‐law, however, has reduced some of the bite of
international standards.

Pursuant to Art. 2.4 TBT, international standards or the relevant parts of them
must be used as the basis for the adoption of technical regulations.27 The AB in its

Even in this situation however, a non‐discrimination test is still embedded in the SPS Agreement:
the ban will cover also potential national production; the import prohibition for foreign products
amounts to a production ban for domestic products.
27 Sometimes, in literature, one finds the view that the TBT and SPS Agreements are positive
integration instruments. The supporters of this view point to the provisions on international
standards to make their point. This view, however, should be discarded. WTO Members do not have
to enact international standards irrespective whether they want to intervene in a particular field.
26
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Report on EC –Sardines, explained that the terms used in Art. 2.4 TBT necessarily
entail that a technical regulation should at the very least not be contradictory to
the relevant international standard. The AB also pointed out that all relevant parts
of an international standard, not only some of them, must form the basis of a
technical regulation (§§ 248 and 250). In the same report, the AB had the
opportunity to provide its understanding of the terms ineffective or inappropriate.
In the dispute, Peru complained that the EC had deviated unjustifiably from an
international standard reflecting the denomination of sardines. I provisionally cut
it out, but I think our argument now is a bit short.

The AB also addressed the question of who carries the burden of proof to show
that a deviation from an international standard has been TBT‐consistent? The AB
reversed the Panelʹs holding concluding that, when a WTO Member does not use
a relevant international standard as the basis for its technical regulation on the
ground that it believes that the standard is either ineffective or inappropriate, the
burden still rests with the complaining party to prove that the international
standard at issue is appropriate and effective for the defendant to reach its
objectives (§ 282). However, the burden of persuasion put on Peru was so low as
to effectively shift the burden of the prima facie argumentation from Peru to the
EC, that is, from the complainant to the respondent, in violation of firmly rooted
principles in GATT/WTO case-law. This is very significant, since there is a
considerable difference between requesting of the complainant to show that an

They will have to base their intervention on such standards, only after they have decided to
intervene. This latter decision nevertheless, is sovereign, and not a matter of legal compulsion:
WTO Members which do not want, for example, to enact legislation regarding the safety of
children’s toys, do not have to anyway adopt the relevant ISO standards.
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international standard is effective and appropriate, and of the respondent that it
is ineffective or inappropriate.28 29

When it comes to unilateral interventions, WTO Members must respect obligations
additional to non‐discrimination, such as, necessity, coherence etc., as noted supra.
The limited TBT/SPS case‐law has with respect to jurisdictional issues followed the
same approach as in GATT cases. As a result, our analysis above holds for the
TBT/SPS‐context as well.

To conclude, the TBT/SPS Agreements do not alter in any significant way the
negative integration‐character of the GATT: EP coming under their purview will
be nationally defined; they will have to respect, nonetheless, requirements
additional to non‐discrimination. Importantly, in line with the GATT, none of
these agreements discusses the jurisdictional ambit of national policies coming
under their purview. We will turn to this issue now.

4.

A Primer on Jurisdiction in CIL

In this Section, we provide an introduction to the treatment of territorial
jurisdiction in CIL. We will not provide an exhaustive account of the origins and

See Horn and Weiler (2007b) for a critical discussion of this and other aspects of the
determination. Note, nonetheless, that Peru did not produce any evidence additional to what it had
included in its complaint, and still managed to prevail.
29 For a very comprehensive analysis on how international standards are being prepared and their
trade relevance, see Sykes (1995).
28
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nature of these rules, but only an introduction to some aspects that are of direct
relevance to the issues at stake here, and in particular to the default rules.30 31

4.1

The Barebones of the DefaultRules

The default rules concerning the territoriality‐ and the nationality‐bases for
prescriptive jurisdiction, can be summarized as follows:

(a) The rules apply in situations where:
(i)

we are neither in the realm of universal jurisdiction;,

(ii)

nor has a bargaining solution (international agreement) been
negotiated;

(b) A state can lawfully exercise prescriptive jurisdiction32:
(i)

on all activities occurring in its own territory (territoriality
principle);

(ii)

over its nationals, even for acts, omissions committed outside its
territory (nationality principle);

For a fuller account, see e.g. the various contributions in Meessen (1996).
It is debatable whether the default rules are a source of WTO law, or simply law that WTO
Members must obey anyway. No matter where one stands on this score, the end result for the
purposes of our discussion is the same: the default rules circumscribe the ambit of permissible
jurisdictional reach, see on this score the views of Pauwelyn (2003) on the one hand, and Trachtman
(1999) and Mavroidis (2008) on the other.
32 There are other bases as well which, exceptionally, might be relevant, such as the passive
protective principle, whereby a state can claim jurisdiction on activities occurring outside its
jurisdiction and aiming at one of its nationals. Anyway, this basis is of no interest to this paper. By
the same token, there is widespread acknowledgement of the protective principle, which enables
states to exercise jurisdiction against activity occurring outside its territory aiming at its national
security, and there is special jurisdiction for activities occurring aboard vessels, aircrafts and
spacecrafts: none of these two bases is of direct relevance to this paper.
30
31
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In case of conflict between the two bases, the territoriality‐principle
prevails;33 34
(c) In case there are effects from an activity taking place in the territory of one
state in the territory of other states, or in case the effects of an activity are
spread over different states, all affected states are, in principle, competent
to exercise prescriptive jurisdiction (effects doctrine).

4.2

The Hierarchy between Territoriality and Nationality

The hierarchy between territoriality and nationality is well documented. In its
often discussed Lotus35 judgment, the Permanent Court of International Justice
(PCIJ) said as much:

Now the first and foremost restriction imposed by international law upon a State
is that –failing the existence of a permissive rule to the contrary‐ it may not
exercise its power in any form in the territory of another State. In this sense
jurisdiction is certainly territorial; it cannot be exercised by a State outside its

Indeed, from early on it has been accepted that states cannot regulate in an extra‐territorial
manner. Viewed from this perspective the (ongoing) discussion on the nature of international law
(whereby we distinguish between those that take the view that absent permissive international
rules, no unilateral exercise of jurisdiction is permissible, and those who take the opposite view,
that is, that international law can impose limits only to the exercise of unilateral jurisdiction) is
futile. No matter what the starting point is, it will inevitably as the case, at least with respect to
many transactions of interest to this paper, that more than one jurisdictions will, in principle,
legitimately believe that they can exercise jurisdiction. See on this point, Dunoff (2005), and
Buxbaum (2006).
34 The interpretation of the term conflict is crucial here and there is asymmetric practice across states
on this score: some will interpret it in a very strict manner and understand conflict a situation
where the individual concerned cannot simultaneously comply with the legislation of two (or
more) states. Others have adopted a looser standard: this is where the comity principle kicks in;
some states will weigh their interest to regulate a particular transaction and will give in (to another
state), if they judge that another state has more of an interest to regulate, even if the individual
concerned could, in theory at least, comply with both regimes.
35 France vs. Turkey, Judgment No 9, September 7, 1927, PCIJ Reports, 1928, Series A, No 10.
33
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territory except by virtue of a permissive rule derived from international custom
or from a convention.36

The same principle has further been adopted early on by domestic courts. Justice
Holmes, for example, proclaimed early in the 20th century:

… the general and almost universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful
or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the country where the act
is done.37

This does not mean that problems cannot arise in such a scenario: it could be, for
example, that the punishment of an act by the state exercising jurisdiction
invoking nationality is different from that of the state exercising jurisdiction on
territoriality; in such cases, it could be that both states might wish to exercise
jurisdiction in cumulative manner.

We can use the facts in Lotus as illustration: a Frenchman shoots from a French
vessel (considered French territory) and kills a Turkish citizen on Turkish soil;
the act takes place in France, its effects are felt in Turkey. The question arises
who has jurisdiction in such cases? State practice first, and international courts
later, have distinguished between objective and subjective territoriality: the former
refers to jurisdiction for any act occurring within the national territory as
circumscribed by the geographic frontiers, the effects of which are also felt
See Lotus, op. cit. at pp. 18‐19. On this score, see also Parrish (2007), and Bradley and Goldsmith
(2006) at pp. 625ff.
37 See Am. Banana Co vs. United Fruit Co. 213 US 347, 356‐359 (1909). Recently, US courts refused to
extend jurisdiction to foreigners challenging the consistency of actions by Swiss companies with US
antitrust law, see F. Hoffman La Roche Ltd. vs. Empagran SA, 542 US 155, 164 (2004); see on this
score, Klevorick and Sykes (2007).
36
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within this territory; the latter covers cases where the effects of an act occurring
outside the national geographic frontiers are felt within it (cases where there are,
in other words, trans‐boundary effects). In this latter case, jurisdiction to adjudicate
the transaction is allocated to both Turkey and France.

4.3

The Effects Doctrine: no Walk in the Park

Jurisdiction based on the effects doctrine is not uncontested. We read, for
example, from the US Restatement on Foreign Relations Law38:

The effects principle is not controversial with respect to acts such as shooting or
even sending libelous publications across a boundary. It is generally accepted
with respect to liability for injury in the state from products made outside the
state and introduced into its stream of commerce. Controversy has arisen as a
result of economic regulation by the US and others, particularly through
competition laws, on the basis of economic effect in their territory, when the
conduct was lawful where carried out. This Restatement takes the position that a
state may exercise jurisdiction based on effects in the state, when the effect or
intended effect is substantial and the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable under
§ 403. (emphasis added).

A threshold issue is the magnitude of the effects that suffice for the effects
doctrine to be applicable. The American Law Institute’s prominent restatement of
Foreign Relations Law of the United States (hereinafter the Restatement) takes the
view that, at the very least, a jurisdiction must demonstrate substantial, direct, and
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See, The Restatement, op. cit.
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foreseeable effects upon its territory.
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Absent such effects, countries cannot

legitimately exercise jurisdiction. What exactly substantial, direct, and foreseeable
means is unclear. The most authoritative guide to their interpretation is state
practice and international courts’ decisions, as well as arbitral bodies’ awards on
this score.

State practice provides us, alas, with incoherent responses: there are states which
liberally assert jurisdiction, and states which are more conservative in this
respect.41 The lack of clarity in the default rules is exemplified, for example, in the
divergent views of Kramer (1995) and Lowenfeld (1995) regarding the manner in
which the US Supreme Court addressed the jurisdictional issue in the highly
contentious Hartford Inc. case, which provoked the disapproval of the UK
government that held the view that it alone had the right to prescribe jurisdiction
over this particular transaction. State practice, nevertheless, is not always
inconsistent: for example, at the time the Restatement was written, it is true that
there was no unanimity across nations as to the application of the effects doctrine
in antitrust issues. The situation is different today with the application of the
effects doctrine by the European Union (EU) and the US in several high‐profile
competition cases during the last two decades.42 Consensus has thus emerged
regarding the acceptance of the application of the effects doctrine in a particular.

See Restatement of the Law Third, Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1990) at p. 238. The
Restatement is considered to be an authentic description of international law practice, and it is
routinely cited in judgments of the highest courts around the world. It has thus exercised a de facto
persuasive effect on courts in the United States and around the world.
40 See The Restatement op. cit. at pp. 244ff.
41 For example, the United States has been often criticized for its policy in this respect both in the
field of human rights, and in the field of international business transactions for asserting
jurisdiction in too liberal a manner, see Lowenfeld (1995).
42 See the extensive analysis in Mavroidis and Neven (1999), and also Colangelo (2007).
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4.4

Overlapping Jurisdictions

It stems from the above, that it is quite possible that more than one state can
exercise prescriptive jurisdiction by virtue of the territoriality principle. In this
case, one can envisage several outcomes.

4.4.1 Cumulative Application of Different Legal Regimes
One possibility is the cumulative application of different legal regimes. There is
strictly speaking nothing legally wrong with assigning jurisdiction concurrently
to several sovereignties.43 For instance, assume that stealing is punished with five
years in prison in A and seven years in B. An individual who is convicted in both
jurisdictions could spend two years in B, having already spent five years in A.
However, it is easy to see that assigning jurisdiction to more than one state with
divergent laws, has potentially serious drawbacks: the fact that courts or
administrations in two or more countries will be involved in the decision making
will lead to duplication of transaction costs; more importantly probably, the
outcome of the combined regulation will typically not be optimal from any
country’s point of view. For instance, in the example above, country A might
consider the additional two years of jail term excessive. It could also be the case
that the party involved cannot simultaneously comply with two decisions
because they are contradictory. More generally, cumulative exercise of
jurisdiction may mitigate as well as exacerbate problems stemming from
unilateral decision making.

This was largely the solution in the often discussed Lotus judgment by the PCIJ. (See France vs.
Turkey, Judgment No 9, September 7, 1927, PCIJ Reports, 1928, Series A, No 10.)
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As a consequence of its many drawbacks, the assignment of overlapping
jurisdiction is discouraged in many pronouncements by courts and international
institutions. A prominent example is again the Restatement. Cumulative
application of regulations nevertheless occurs quite often in practice.

4.4.2 Comity
A second possibility is that all but one state refrain from exercising jurisdiction, a
solution that is often referred to as comity in PIL. This is most likely the case in
situations where there is agreement that one state clearly has more of an interest
to regulate a particular transaction or activity than other states which could have
legitimately exercised prescriptive jurisdiction as well. For instance, the
Restatement expresses support for this option (p. 247):
When possible, the two states should consult with each other. If one state has a
clearly greater interest, the other should defer, by abandoning its regulation or
interpreting it or modifying it so as to eliminate the conflict….

This is what the reasonableness standard, briefly alluded to above, essentially
amounts to. Since there is hierarchy between territoriality‐ and nationality‐,
reasonable exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction will be called for when the effects
of an activity are ‘felt’ across various territories. The Restatement acknowledges as
much:

Where regulation of transnational activity is based on its effects in the territory of
the regulating state, the principle of reasonableness calls for limiting the exercise
of jurisdiction so as to minimize conflict with the jurisdiction of other states,
particularly with the state where the act takes place. (p. 250)
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It is not easy to codify what should be considered reasonable exercise of
prescriptive jurisdiction; it is, nonetheless, clear that this principle operates as a
restraining factor (for some) on the exercise of jurisdiction. Under the
reasonableness‐standard states will, either through unilateral action (comity) or
through a negotiated settlement conclude that some of them should not exercise
jurisdiction over a particular transaction and let others do so.

In practice, one could imagine hundreds of scenarios where reasonable exercise
of jurisdiction is called for. But rather than laying down general principles, the
Restatement provides a comprehensive list of elements that constitute the
reasonableness‐standard. Consequently, a state, which, in principle, can
legitimately exercise jurisdiction, might decide not to do so, based on a
consideration which comprises, but is not necessarily limited to, the following
criteria:44

(i)

the link of the activity with another state (nationality, or
territoriality, in the sense that there are direct, substantial and
foreseeable effects with another jurisdiction);

(ii)

the importance of regulating the activity to another state;

(iii)

the existence of justified (legitimate) expectations;

(iv)

the importance of the regulation to the international system;

(v)

the manner in which such transactions have been prescribed in
prior relevant state practice.

44

See The Restatement, op. cit., at pp. 244ff.
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The Restatement also provides an example of what could be considered
unreasonable exercise of jurisdiction:

… regulation by the United States of the labor relations of a foreign vessel that
regularly calls on the United States may be unreasonable; regulation of the
vessel’s safety standards may not be unreasonable. (p. 246)

The intuition here seems to be that, absent respect of strict safety standards on
the foreign vessel, an accident might occur in US territory, or an environmental
hazard that might have an impact (on US territory as well). The link with the US
territory seems less strong in case, for example, workers on the foreign vessel
receive wages below the statutory minimum reserved to the corresponding job
when performed on US territory by workers legally employed in the US.45 As
suggested above, a field (e.g., antitrust)‐specific evaluation is warranted, since
practice has developed in asymmetric manner across fields.46

Comity happens quite rarely in practice however, because there is often
disagreement as to which state should be the one designated to regulate. Take
the example of an international merger between companies originating in
countries A and B. Assume that 30 % of their sales are in the market of A, 25% in
B, 35% in C, and 10% in D. Should C and D desist simply because companies A

This is a very interesting example. We will come back to it when we discuss the applicability of
our discussion here to environmental disputes.
46 One probable explanation is that, whereas there is an emerging world‐wide consensus as to what
should be the criteria for antitrust intervention, this is hardly the case in other fields of regulatory
activity. Most competition regimes understand the role of antitrust as the means to promote rivalry
in a given market, using consumer welfare as proxy to measure whether rivalry indeed exists. This
quasi‐uniformity concerning the substantive criteria for antitrust intervention probably explains the
world‐wide acceptance of the effects doctrine in this field: after all, the importing state is the one that
suffers (in consumer welfare terms) from say monopolistic prices of a foreign cartel.
45
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and B are foreign? Or should C exercise jurisdiction, being the country with the
largest sales? And how should the antitrust authorities of A and B behave?
Should both A and B regulate this transaction? Should one of them desist, and, if
yes, on what grounds should it desist? What if the new merged entity will have a
monopoly in B, but no such thing in A? PIL sheds little, if any light, on this
problem: there is no generally acceptable hierarchy across the various default
rules, except for the one already mentioned, that is, that territoriality comes
before nationality.

4.4.3 International Agreements (Bargaining Solutions)
The third possible solution in case of overlapping jurisdictions is an international
agreement. For instance, the Restatement points to this option:
…When neither state has a clearly strong interest, states often attempt to
eliminate the conflict so as to reduce international friction and avoid putting
those who are the object of the regulations in a difficult situation. (p. 247)

When two states search for a bargaining solution to address a jurisdictional
ambiguity, they can allocate jurisdiction between them to their liking, to the
extent that they do not interfere with the jurisdictional space of a third state.

As Parrish (2007, pp. 29ff.) points out, there has recently been an explosion of
extra‐territorial cases in copyright, securities regulation, trademarks and trade
names, intellectual property, corporate law and governance, bankruptcy, tax,
criminal laws, civil rights, labour laws – the list is endless.47 But the explosion of

There is abundant literature on this issue. Vagts (2003), Avi‐Yonah (2003), and Baumgartner
(2004) provide a very adequate synthesis.
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extra‐territorial cases has not been accompanied by a clarification of the legal
framework within which prescriptive jurisdiction should operate: the default rules
continue to leave significant discretion to the state contemplating to exercise
prescriptive jurisdiction, since we still lack rules as to which state should regulate
when effects are spread over more than one territory. As a result, disputes across
states as to who should be regulating a particular transaction are quite common.

4.5

The Relationship Between the Default Rules and the WTO
Agreement

A central issue for this paper is the relationship between the WTO Agreement
and the default rules. This is not a trivial issue, however. As noted in the
Introduction, the text of the WTO Agreement is silent on the relationship, and it
has not been addressed in case law either. In order to explain our own
understanding of this issue, we need to take a broader perspective on the WTO
Agreement.

As is often pointed out, the WTO Agreement is “incomplete” in the parlance of
contract theory, in a number of ways. As a consequence of this incompleteness,
the Agreement has been interpreted to include further restrictions than those
explicitly stated in the text. A prime evidence of this feature is Art. XXIII.1 GATT,
which specifies the legal grounds for a complaint. This provision states that

If any contracting party should consider that any benefit accruing to it directly or
indirectly under this Agreement is being nullified or impaired as the result of
...
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…the application by another contracting party of any measure, whether or not it
conflicts with the provisions of this Agreement… (emphasis added)

As can be seen from the italicized terms, the Agreement involves commitments
that go beyond what is explicitly stated in the text. This raises the question of
what exactly is it that Members have agreed upon? This is an important question,
since whatever Members have agreed upon, should fall outside the ambit of the
default rules.

A first observation can here be drawn from the example we discussed in the
Introduction: it is the default rules that prevent a country from imposing its tariffs
or domestic instruments in foreign territory. For instance, the EC does not collect
a value‐added tax in the US market. If these rules did not exist it would be
pointless to form the GATT. But the GATT and the default rules are in a sense not
equally dependent on each other. While an imposition of the jurisdictional rules
alone is likely to have some impact, in order for a GATT‐like agreement to have any
impact, it must be supported by jurisdictional rules. More importantly, as we will try to
show, for the GATT to be construed in accordance with its intended function as a
negative integration agreement, it is quintessential that the default rules are observed.

It seems relatively clear that the default rules are not applicable in the case of tariff
bindings, since these are negotiated.48 However, as we will see, when finer tariff
classifications are made unilaterally they are probably relevant. But the
agreement does not include any bindings of domestic policies, so the there is
more scope for default rules to be applicable for such measures. The question here,
But, of course, Canada cannot contract the import tariffs that say exporters to the Australian
market will be paying. In this sense, tariff‐setting occurs within the default rules.
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however, is how much the agreement can be said to cover? One could here argue
along two very different lines, leading to opposite conclusions concerning the
applicability of the default rules. We believe both of these arguments are relevant,
but that they are applicable to different situations.

One line of reasoning would focus on the fact that the agreement does regulate
the pursuit of domestic policies through e.g. the non‐discrimination provisions.
Consequently, it could be argued, there is an implicit acceptance of whatever
policies Members might choose that are consistent with this explicit regulation of
domestic instruments. This view is reinforced by the fact that there are a couple
of explicit remedies for unfair trade advantages, in the form of duties levied in
the case of dumping and subsidization. According to this line of reasoning, since
there is an implicit acceptance of the consequences of letting Members
unilaterally decide on their domestic policies, the default rules are not applicable.
There are some important shortcomings inherent in this view, and we will be
returning to this point infra.

A second line of reasoning instead starts from the observation that the WTO
Agreement was not created in a legal vacuum, but in a situation where PIL,
including the default rules, applied. Also, the Agreement does not contain any
statement to the effect that these rules are not applicable. Hence, the only
reasonable interpretation is that countries, when signing the Agreement, did so
with the expectation that the default rules indeed are applicable.

In what follows we will argue that the first line of reasoning is applicable only in
presence of what we call “commercial externalities”, while the second
argumentation is relevant in situations of “physical” (and possibly “moral”)
48

externalities. A (negative) commercial externality arises when lax EP in the
exporting country provides its exporters with a competitive advantage at the
perceived expense of the importing country government. A “physical” trans‐
boundary externality from lax EP takes the traditional form of, say, acid rain.

The fundamental reason why these two types of externalities, which stem from
the exporting country’s unilateral pursuit of EP, are treated so differently goes
back to the basic purpose of the agreement. The GATT/WTO is an agreement
regulating commercial relations between WTO Members. Hence, WTO Members
should be assumed to have accepted the resulting commercial externalities from
unilaterally pursued policies, to the extent these are not caught by the non‐
discrimination provisions. As a result, the default rules do not apply in case of
commercial externalities. In particular, the effects doctrine cannot be invoked to
give a country the right to regulate against such an effect.

The WTO is not meant to regulate physical environmental externalities, however,
and therefore it cannot be argued that WTO Members have agreed to accept
trans‐boundary physical externalities. Consequently, in the absence of other
agreements – MEAs, for instance – the default rules are applicable.

More to the point: the very purpose of the GATT is to harmonize conditions of
competition within and not across markets: once a ticket to entry, in the form of
customs duty, has been paid, imported products should be treated as if they
were domestic. Indeed, there would be no trade at all if the importing state could
control for differences in income‐taxation, EP‐regulation and what have you. To
paraphrase Dunoff, this would be the death of the trade regime, albeit for a
different reason: prices of all goods would be equated to that of the highest de
49

nominator. Trade is function of endowments and, in part, the outcome of
competition across regulatory regimes as well. Societies make different choices as
to the level of taxation, the level of EP, the level of antitrust enforcement etc. All
such choices affect trade, even if only remotely so. By signing the GATT (and
then the WTO), trading partners accepted to conduct trade on the basis of such
differences. When they wanted to address some of them, they did so explicitly:
the antidumping provisions are a very appropriate illustration here. This does
not mean, nonetheless, that whenever there is silence, there is acceptance of the
other’s practices. This is precisely where the default rules kick in: Art. XX GATT
explicitly allows WTO Members to deviate from their obligations in order to
protect, inter alia, animal life. To do that, however, they must have jurisdiction
over such animal life. Just like WTO Members cannot tax income of foreigners
made abroad, they cannot, in principle, protect foreign animal life. To do that,
they must show a nexus with their own jurisdiction (e.g., a change in the
ecological equilibrium affects all nations). To accept the opposite would lead us
to absurd results such as A taxing B nationals’ income made in B. In a nutshell,
unless the default rules have been observed, the GATT cannot function, at the
very least not in accordance with its intended function, that is, as an instrument
promoting trade liberalization through negative integration.

4.6

Jurisdiction and the Environment in CIL

4.6.1 Environmental Conflicts and the Default Rules
It is by now well accepted that states cannot, through their actions or omissions,
cause environmental pollution that has an impact on other states. As Sands
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(2003, 461ff.) referring to the Case Concerning the Territorial Jurisdiction of the
International Commission of the River Oder adjudicated by the PCIJ notes:

As early as 1929, the PCIJ had held that the utilization of international rivers,
including their flow, was subject to international law: the Court identified the
‘community of interests in a navigable river [which] becomes the basis of a
common legal right, the essential features of which are the perfect equality of all
riparian states in the use of the whole course of the river and the exclusion of any
preferential privilege of any one riparian in relation to the others.

This case did not directly concern environment, but the use of rivers for
navigation. But in 1997, in the Case Concerning the Gabcikovo‐Nagymaros Project,
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) re‐affirmed and extended this principle to
non‐navigational uses:
The Court considers that Czechoslovakia, by unilaterally assuming control of a
shared resource, and thereby depriving Hungary of its right to an equitable and
reasonable share of the natural resources of the Danube – with the continuing
effects of the diversion of these waters on the ecology of the riparian state of the
Szigetköz – failed to respect the proportionality which is required by
international law.49

Probably the most eloquent expression of this principle is by the Institut de droit
international (IDI) in its 1987 Resolution on Transboundary Air Pollution. Art. 2
states:50
(1997) ICJ Reports 7 at §85.
The IDI is a highly prestigious, non‐governmental institution aiming at promoting the
understanding and implementation of public international law. Its work is often cited by
international courts.
49
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In the exercise of their sovereign right to exploit their resources pursuant to their
own environmental policies, states shall be under a duty to take all appropriate
and effective measures to ensure that their activities or those conducted within
their jurisdiction or under their control cause no transboundary air pollution. 51

It is clear that the effects doctrine may often be applicable in the case of trans‐
boundary

environmental

problems.

For

instance,

taking

the

case

of

environmental pollution that is carried by a river, and applying the direct,
foreseeable and substantive‐standard as explained in the Restatement, we can
observe that:

(a) the effects will be direct, since nothing intervenes between the upstream
pollution of the river and environmental damage downstream;
(b) they will be foreseeable, since the direction of the flow is clear;
(c) depending on the extent of the environmental pollution, the effects could
be substantive.
A similar type of reasoning can often be pursued in the case of air‐born pollution,
or pollution through seas. In all these instances the default rules give the affected
state jurisdiction over acts committed outside its territory.

4.6.2 No Universal Jurisdiction Through Violation of Jus Cogens in
Case of Environmental Damage
PIL views certain values to be of such significance as to dominate concerns for
national sovereignty – this is the notion of jus cogens. For some specific
transactions or activities states therefore have universal jurisdiction. Universal
51

See 62 AIDI (1987 – II).
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jurisdiction is conferred for transactions where a consensus has been reached
among the members of the world community as to the higher values that are at
stake. There are ongoing debates about the content of the jus cogens, but apart
from § 33 of the Barcelona Traction judgment by the ICJ, and sporadic mentions in
the various drafts of the United Nations General Assembly Resolution on State
Responsibility, there is to the best of our knowledge no comprehensive “official
multilateral pronouncement” on this score. It is clear that there is universal
jurisdiction for responses to international crimes (e.g., piracy, terrorism), These
are exceptional cases and concern specific transactions only.

There was some discussion during the drafting of the International Law
Commission (ILC) on State Responsibility52 to include massive environmental
pollution among the provisions that would call for universal jurisdiction as
violations of jus cogens. Such reference, nevertheless, was not included in the
final draft, as voted by the United Nations General Assembly. But it shows that
the ILC at least contemplated that causing trans‐boundary environmental
externalities should not amount to a trivial breach of an international law canon.
Hence, important to this study, there is no instance of universal jurisdiction with
regard to environmental hazards.

4.7

The Analysis to Follow

In what follows we discuss a series of scenarios concerning disputes related to
environmental policies that a WTO court could face, and we place particular
focus on jurisdictional aspects. We examine these abstract scenarios since the
These articles were eventually adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 2001, see UN
GA A/RES/56/83 of 28 January 2002.
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paucity of case‐law on trade and environment makes it very hard to draw more
general conclusions on how jurisdictional issues would be addressed by WTO
adjudicating bodies. We do not claim that these scenarios exhaust all interesting
types of disputes, but in our view they cover a number of interesting archetypical
situations.

For each scenario, we will first discuss what we believe a WTO panel would have
ruled, in light of current case‐law. We will then seek to determine what the
default rules would add to the panel’s ruling, if taken into account properly. In
Section 11 we will draw some overarching conclusions on the basis of the
discussions of these scenarios.

5

Tariff Distinctions Based on Environmental Impact

In this Section, we discuss scenarios where EP are couched in the form of
negotiated tariff classifications, in the sense that the importing state reserves
differential tariff treatment for a product produced in an environment‐friendly
(EF) manner compared to the same product produced in an environmentally
unfriendly (EUF) manner. In Scenario I (Section 6.1) the EP is practiced through
multilaterally agreed tariff classifications, and in Scenario II (Section 6.2) the EP
is practiced through unilateral tariff classification.
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5.1

Unilateral Tariff Distinctions Based on Environmental Impact

Scenario I: During tariff negotiations, A makes a tariff promise to import product x at
10% import duty. Product x is classified at the 6‐digit level (HS).53 Subsequently, A
unilaterally distinguishes its tariff promise at the 8‐digit level between x produced in
EUF manner, facing the 10% duty, and in an EF manner, imported at 0%. The schedule
of concessions of A enters into force along with all other schedules. Subsequent to the
entry into force of the schedules, B challenges the classification operated by A, arguing
that EUF and EF x are like products, and that the former should also benefit from 0%
import duties in A’s market.
Before we discuss how a GATT panel would approach this complaint, we need
to explain in sufficient detail the manner in which a tariff classification can be
legally challenged before a GATT panel. The explanation is quite lengthy for two
reasons: first, it might seem counter‐intuitive to the non‐expert that a contractual
party can challenge a contractual term to which it has agreed; second, law is
unclear in this respect, and case‐law is far from being mature either. The three
sub‐sections that immediately follow are inter‐linked: in 5.1.1, we explain why a
tariff classification that has been included in the final product of a trade round
can still be challenged, if a WTO Member takes the view that it is not GATT‐
consistent. In 5.1.2, we briefly explain the parameters of GATT‐consistency, that
is, the MFN‐obligation. In 5.1.3 we briefly return to Art. XX GATT, and explain
under what conditions a WTO Member can legitimately deviate from its
obligations, such as MFN. We then discuss the solution to the scenario.

The Harmonized System (HS) classification is explained infra in more detail. Briefly, it contains
classifications for traded goods ranging from 2‐ to 6‐digits; the higher the number of digits, the
more specific the description is (e.g., 2 digit: vehicles; 6 digit: passenger cars).
53
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5.1.1 The Right to Challenge Tariff Classifications Under the WTO54
At the end of a multilateral negotiation, the WTO Secretariat will circulate the
tariff promises (schedules of concessions) of each and every WTO Member to the
whole WTO Membership. The latter will sign them and agree on the date of their
entry into force. The fact that all schedules of concessions have been agreed and
signed by all WTO Members at the end of a negotiating round does not,
however, suffice to render them GATT‐consistent.

Tariff concessions are made between WTO Members using the tariff
classifications of the Harmonized System (HS) as the common language to describe
traded goods. The HS classifies goods from 2‐6‐digits, with common descriptions
of approximately 5,000 commodities at the 6-digit level.

WTO Members can unilaterally further sub‐divide the HS classifications. Art. 3.3
HS reads to this effect:

Nothing in this Article shall prevent a Contracting Party from establishing, in its
Customs tariff or statistical nomenclatures, subdivisions classifying goods
beyond the level of the Harmonized system, provided that any such subdivision
is added and coded at a level beyond that of the six‐digit numerical code set out
in the Annex to this Convention.

The recent AB report on EC – Chicken Cuts acknowledges that the HS is context,
in the sense of Art. 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), to

This sub‐section is relevant for Scenario II as well. To avoid unnecessary repetition, we include all
of the discussion concerning GATT‐consistent scheduling of tariff concessions in one place, that is,
in this sub‐section.
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the Agreement establishing the WTO. This means that, in case of dispute over the
content of a tariff classification, GATT panels will have to refer to it in order to
resolve the dispute.

Whereas the legality of the HS classifications up to the 6‐digit level cannot be
disputed, this is not necessarily the case with 8‐digit‐ (and beyond)
classifications. WTO Members might object for example, to a tariff classification
at the 8‐digit level which distinguishes between environmentally‐friendly and –
unfriendly goods. Case‐law to which we turn in what immediately follows, has
explained under what conditions this can be the case.

In Spain – Un‐roasted Coffee,55 a GATT panel outlawed a sub‐classification that
Spain had unilaterally introduced, where it distinguished between roasted and
un‐roasted coffee, subsequent to its original commitment where it had made no
such distinction. Brazil claimed to have suffered trade damage as a result, and
brought a complaint. The rationale for outlawing the unilateral distinction was
that absent rectifications (that is, changes which do not affect the substance of the
commitment made), WTO Members cannot unilaterally modify schedules that
have already been agreed upon.56 Ex post hoc tariff classifications are, thus,
GATT‐inconsistent, if they materially affect the value of the concession granted.

During the EC – Bananas III dispute between the EC and various banana‐
exporting countries, the AB went one step further and held that even agreed
conditions can be judged to be GATT‐inconsistent, if they do not respect the
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See GATT Doc. BISD 28S/102.
See the analysis in Mavroidis (2007) pp. 112ff.
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multilateral framework. 57 The question namely arose, whether a WTO Member
can specify the conditions of import in its schedule of concessions in a
discriminatory, that is, a GATT‐inconsistent manner, depending on the origin of
the imported good? The EC had included in its schedule of concessions a
condition, according to which some WTO Members (the ACP58 countries, and
those who had concluded with the EC the so‐called Framework Agreement), would
profit from a preferential rate on bananas, whereas the remaining WTO Members
would not. A series of bananas‐exporting WTO Members complained, claiming
that the measure at hand was inconsistent with the MFN rule. The EC in
response argued, inter alia, that its regime was consistent with the GATT, since it
had been notified to the WTO Membership, and

had gone through the

certification process as well, without any WTO Member raising an issue as to its
legality. The question before the Panel could, thus, be phrased as follows: do
WTO Members, when scheduling their concessions, have to observe the GATT‐
disciplines? Or, conversely, are legally relevant schedules only those that have been
certified, or also those that were exchanged during the negotiation‐stage?

The wording of Art. II.1b GATT59 provides a solid prima facie basis in favour of
accepting the EC‐approach: if at all, the treatment of imported goods is subjected
to conditions etc., included in the schedule, but nowhere does Art. II GATT

We use the term EC when we discuss actual disputes and not EU, as we do elsewhere, since it is
the EC that is the member of the WTO (Art. XI of the Agreement establishing the WTO).
58 ACP stands for African, Caribbean and Pacific countries which were linked to the EC through the
(then) Lomé and, subsequently, Cotounou agreements.
59 The Panel and the AB discussed the present litigation against the background of Art. 4.1 of the
Agreement on Agriculture (AG) which reflects a standard very comparable to that of Art. II.1b
GATT. The fact that, as the quoted passage underscores, the AB based its findings on the Headnote –
jurisprudence which is an Art. II GATT‐jurisprudence, leaves no room for doubt that, in the eyes of
the two WTO adjudicating bodies, there is absolute parallelism between Art. II.1b GATT on the one
hand and Art. 4.1 AG on the other.
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mention that the conditions imposed should be GATT‐consistent. By virtue of the
in dubio mitius legal principle, one would expect that a WTO adjudicating body
would have found that, in the absence of explicit, unambiguous transfer of
sovereignty in this respect, trading nations could conclude whatever they please:
this is what contractual autonomy amounts to. 60

61

The Panel first, and the AB

then, recalling the earlier Headnote‐jurisprudence, rejected, in their EC – Bananas
III reports, the argument of the EC. In their view, a WTO Member can, through
conditions attached to its schedule, grant other WTO Members rights but it
cannot, through this means, diminish its obligations. We quote from §§ 154 of the
AB report:

The market access concessions for agricultural products that were made in the
Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations are set out in Membersʹ
Schedules annexed to the Marrakesh Protocol, and are an integral part of the GATT
1994. By the terms of the Marrakesh Protocol, the Schedules are ‘Schedules to the
GATT 1994’, and Article II:7 of the GATT 1994 provides that ‘Schedules annexed to
this Agreement are hereby made an integral part of Part I of this Agreement’.
With respect to concessions contained in the Schedules annexed to the GATT 1947,
the panel in United States ‐ Restrictions on Importation of Sugar (‘United States ‐ Sugar
Headnote’) found that:

... Article II permits contracting parties to incorporate into
their Schedules acts yielding rights under the General
Agreement but not acts diminishing obligations under that
Agreement.

60
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Note that the AB, like many international courts, has adhered to this principle.
To the extent of course, that they do not violate peremptory norms of Public International Law.
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This principle is equally valid for the market access concessions and commitments
for agricultural products contained in the Schedules annexed to the GATT 1994.
The ordinary meaning of the term ‘concessions’ suggests that a Member may yield
rights and grant benefits, but it cannot diminish its obligations.

Remarkably, the AB, a body with a pronounced tendency to adopt textual
interpretations, this time paid lip service (if at all) to the wording of the relevant
text (Art. 4.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture). The AB did not even summarily
discuss the legal value of Protocols of Accession in this context, either: it refers to
the Marrakesh Protocol, but does not even discuss the legal value of the
multilateral review of annexed schedules? And, importantly, what is the legal
value of the Marrakesh Protocol itself? Instead, it moved to dismiss the claims
presented by the EC based, for all practical purposes, on the Headnote‐
jurisprudence. This jurisprudence however, provides no response to the question
of why GATT schedules of concessions have to observe the GATT‐disciplines,
rather than sequencing the latter to the former? It provides simply an assertion:
they must do that. This reasoning is not satisfactory from a legal perspective.

It is less clear whether from an economic point of view the AB’s decision is
desirable or not. But on the negative side is a fairly fundamental argument: if the
parties to this negotiation agreed to use a finer classification scheme than
provided through the HS system, then one should expect that there were mutual
gains from doing this.

Arguments in support of the AB’s decision would probably primarily have to be
built on the added complexity of the negotiations that a finer scheme might
entail. Were one to introduce a comprehensive legal review of all schedules at the
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end of a negotiation, the process would be probably disproportionately
burdened: in the absence of centralized control of legality in the WTO, it would
be essentially incumbent upon WTO Members to check each other’s schedule
from a GATT‐consistency perspective. Since, Art. 23.2 DSU has outlawed
unilateral qualifications of illegality, one could potentially imagine dozens of
panels introduced at this stage. This is not a mere theoretical possibility: recall
that classification at the 8‐digit, the GATT consistency of which cannot be ex ante
guaranteed, is very much state practice today. In light of the above, it seems
reasonable to defend, from a policy‐perspective at least, the (implicit) thesis
advocated by the AB: the multilateral review occurring with the exchange of schedules
is limited to verification of the accuracy of commitments; the multilateral review has no
bearing on their legality (GATT‐consistency).

In order to see the relevance of the above for our discussion, assume, for
example, that during the Doha Round, a WTO Member enters an 8‐digit
classification, whereby it distinguishes between steel products produced in a
manner that respects environment and all other steel products, reserving a more
favourable treatment to the former. Even if all WTO Members sign on to the
Doha Round, and the final agreement enters into force, it would still be possible
for a WTO Member producing steel products in a manner that burdens the
environment, to successfully challenge the consistency of the 8‐digit classification
with the multilateral rules.
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5.1.2 The MFN Clause
The second restriction on WTO Members ability to make environment‐based
tariff distinctions, come from the MFN clause. We will here briefly present some
basic legal aspects of this provision.

(a) The Barebones of the MFN Clause
By acceding to the WTO, a country should, by virtue of Art. I GATT, benefit from
the best possible treatment granted by incumbents to imported products with
respect to, in principle, all measures affecting trade.62 More specifically:

(i)with respect to, in principle, all measures which affect trade either de
jure or de facto, any advantage granted to goods originating anywhere in
the world;
(ii) must be extended to the like products;
(iii) originating in any WTO Member;
(iv) immediately and unconditionally.

The standard of review that has been applied by WTO adjudicating bodies in
Art. I GATT cases is quite favourable to the complainant since there is no need to
demonstrate intent to discriminate, nor resulting trade effects. Of importance to
our paper are two of the four elements of the MFN mentioned above: likeness
and unconditional application. We will take them in turn.

(b) The meaning of “like”

Hence, the coverage of MFN extends beyond trade instruments; it covers domestic instruments as
well. The analysis presented here is also pertinent for domestic instruments as well.
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Likeness is far from being a self‐interpreting concept. GATT/WTO jurisprudence
has employed various criteria to establish likeness. But tariff classification emerges
as probably the dominant criterion in the context of Art. I GATT. First, the 1978
GATT Panel Report on EEC – Animal Feed Proteins moved towards this criterion.
In this case, the question arose as to whether, by treating different protein
products in different ways, the European Community was violating its
obligations. There was little doubt that the products at hand could be regarded
as substitutable. The question, however, was whether substitutability was
appropriate to decide likeness under Art. I GATT. The Panel decided that this
should not be the case.
The Panel noted that the general most‐favoured‐nation treatment provided for in
Article I:1 … did not mention directly competitive or substitutable products. In
this regard the Panel did not consider animal, marine and synthetic proteins to
be products like those vegetable proteins covered by the measures.

The GATT Panel Report on Japan ‐ SPF Dimension Lumber went a step further and
provided an explicit acknowledgement of the relevance of tariff classification as
the dominant criterion to establish likeness (§§ 5.11 – 5.12):

… if a claim of likeness was raised by a contracting party in relation to the tariff
treatment of its goods on importation by some other contracting party, such a
claim should be based on the classification of the latter, i.e., the importing
country’s tariff.

The Panel noted in this respect that ‘dimension lumber’ as defined by Canada
was a concept extraneous to the Japanese Tariff … nor did it belong to any
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internationally accepted customs classification. The Panel concluded therefore
that reliance by Canada on the concept of dimension lumber was not an
appropriate basis for establishing ‘likeness’ of products under Article I:1 of the
General Agreement.63

GATT panels have also implicitly emphasized the relevance of customs
classification for the purposes of defining likeness, by dismissing the relevance of
certain other factors that responding Members have referred to. For example, the
panel report on Spain – Un‐roasted Coffee set aside the relevance of process‐based
distinctions when dealing with a complaint by Brazil to the effect that a Spanish
classification of un‐roasted coffee between Colombian mild, other mild,
unwashed Arabica, robusta and other, which accorded to the first two categories
a duty free treatment, to the last three a 7% import duty, while the duty for
roasted coffee was left un‐bound; this practice, the Panel found, was inconsistent
with Art. I GATT. It noted (§§ 4.7 – 4.10:

The Panel examined all arguments that had been advanced during the
proceedings for the justification of a different tariff treatment for various groups
and types of un‐roasted coffee. It noted that these arguments mainly related to
organoleptic differences resulting from geographical factors, cultivation
methods, the processing of the beans, and the genetic factor. The Panel did not
consider that such differences were sufficient reason to allow for a different
treatment. It pointed out that it was not unusual in the case of agricultural
Note that panels dealt in both cases with goods such as protein products and dimension lumber.
Such products do not come under a two‐ or four‐digit level. Although case‐law has not provided us
a number, it seems safe to conclude that the higher the number of digits involved, the easier it will
be to show likeness. There should be no doubt that the six‐digit level provides detailed enough
classifications. A similar criterion (detailed classifications) has been privileged by the AB to decide
on likeness under Art. III.2 GATT in the Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II report.
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products that the taste and aroma of the end‐product would differ because of one
or several of the above‐mentioned factors.

The Panel furthermore found relevant to its examination of the matter that un‐
roasted coffee was mainly, if not exclusively, sold in the form of blends,
combining various types of coffee, and that coffee in its end‐use, was universally
regarded as a well‐defined and single product intended for drinking.

The Panel noted that no other contracting party applied its tariff regime in
respect of un‐roasted, non‐decaffeinated coffee in such a way that different types
of coffee were subject to different tariff rates.

In light of the foregoing, the Panel concluded that un‐roasted, non‐decaffeinated
coffee beans listed in the Spanish Customs Tariff … should be considered as like
products within the meaning of Article I:1. (italics in the original).

Having established the importance of tariff classification for determining likeness
for an MFN complaint, the question arises whether any tariff classification can
serve as criterion to decide on likeness? Recall that the harmonized tariff
classification extends down to the 6‐digit level. WTO Members can, nonetheless,
shape their tariff bindings using 8‐digit classifications. One could imagine that by
introducing tariff distinctions at the 8‐digit level, Members could make products
that otherwise would be considered as ‘like’, to be viewed as ‘unlike’.
Importantly, they could do as much by introducing process‐based distinctions:
assuming for example that at the 6‐digit level the item construction material is
listed and goods are bound at 10% import duty, a WTO Member could introduce
at the 8‐digit level a distinction between asbestos‐containing and asbestos‐free
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construction material, imposing a 10% import duty on the former and a 0%
import duty on the latter. Are such distinctions GATT‐consistent? The GATT
panel on Spain – Un‐roasted Coffee would have responded in the negative.64 Is this
still good law?

There are no more recent cases that squarely address this issue. The only case
from which one could draw useful references is the AB report on EC – Tariff
Preferences.65 It seems that, if a criterion for tariff classifications that has been
unilaterally employed by the classifying WTO Member has been accepted as an
objective criterion, then 8‐ or more digit classifications can also serve as criteria to
decide on likeness.

(c) The meaning of “unconditionally”
By virtue of the MFN obligation, WTO Members must extend any advantage (as
understood above) immediately and unconditionally to all WTO Members. The
term immediately seems to suggest that no time should lapse between the
granting of an advantage in the first instance, and its extension to all like
products originating in WTO Members. The term unconditionally, on the other
hand, calls for an interpretation whereby no conditions should be attached when
an advantage is being extended. The difference in content notwithstanding, WTO
adjudicating bodies will typically review the two terms in tandem. The AB report
on Canada – Autos is a good illustration of this point (§§ 75 – 86).

Note that the Panel did not base its conclusions solely on classification, but on consumer
preferences as well. It is difficult to ascertain which the more important concern was.
65 For a more detailed discussion of this case, see infra.
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With respect to the interpretation of the term unconditionally, the issue that has
occupied panels is, to what extent only conditions additional to those which are
necessary for the granting of an advantage in the first place, should be relevant
for the interpretation of the term unconditionally, or, conversely, if no conditions
at all should be imposed in the first instance? It seems that the latter reading
should be irrelevant for the interpretation of the term unconditionally: if at all,
such a discussion should take place in the context of the likeness‐determination.
Nevertheless, much of the case‐law relating to the interpretation of the term
unconditionally blurs this distinction. There is a first category of cases (panel and
working party reports), which interpret the term unconditionally as equivalent to
outlawing any conditions imposed by the importing WTO Member. These
reports for all practical purposes do not compare two situations to see whether
additional commitments have been imposed, for the granting of the same
advantage. They outlaw the imposition of a condition irrespective of
discrimination across two transactions:

(i) the GATT Panel Report on Belgian Family Allowances, concerning tax
exemptions for products purchased by public bodies made conditional on
the existence of a certain system of family allowances to be in force in the
exporting country, were found to be inconsistent with Art. I.1 GATT;
(ii) the GATT Panel Report on EEC – Imports of Beef reflects the view that
conditioning a duty waiver upon certification by a particular government
violates the obligation to grant MFN unconditionally;
(iii) the Working Party Report on Accession of Hungary66 reflects the view that
to condition a tariff treatment upon the prior acceptance of a cooperation
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Report adopted on 30 July 1973, see GATT Doc. BISD 20S/34.
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agreement is a violation of the requirement imposed by Art. I.1 GATT to
grant MFN unconditionally;
(iv) the WTO Panel Report on Indonesia – Autos found that Indonesian
practices granting tax advantages to Korean companies which had
entered into arrangements with Indonesian companies were inconsistent
with the obligation under Art. I.1 GATT to grant MFN unconditionally;
(v) perhaps, even more dramatically, the Panel Report on EC – Tariff
Preferences in §§ 7.59 and 7.60 adopts an interpretation of the term
unconditionally, whereby it becomes impossible to attach any conditions,
not even when the advantage is granted in the first place:

In the Panelʹs view, moreover, the term ‘unconditionally’ in Article I:1 has a
broader meaning than simply that of not requiring compensation. While the
Panel acknowledges the European Communities’ argument that conditionality in
the context of traditional MFN clauses in bilateral treaties may relate to
conditions of trade compensation for receiving MFN treatment, the Panel does
not consider this to be the full meaning of ‘unconditionally’ under Article I:1.
Rather, the Panel sees no reason not to give that term its ordinary meaning under
Article I:1, that is, ‘not limited by or subject to any conditions.’

Because the tariff preferences under the Drug Arrangements are accorded only
on the condition that the receiving countries are experiencing a certain gravity of
drug problems, these tariff preferences are not accorded ‘unconditionally’ to the
like products originating in all other WTO Members, as required by Article I:1.
The Panel therefore finds that the tariff advantages under the Drug
Arrangements are not consistent with Article I:1 of GATT 1994.
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There is another group of cases that do not take such an absolute approach.
These reports compare two situations and essentially try to ascertain to what
extent additional conditions have been imposed when extending an already
granted (probably, following the fulfilment of specified conditions) advantage:

(i) the GATT Panel Report on EEC – Minimum Import Prices dealt with a
complaint concerning a payment deposit that the EC authorities required
from all countries that could not guarantee a specified minimum import
price. However, since the payment of the deposit was requested by all
exporting countries falling into this category, the EC scheme was not
considered to be a violation of Art. I.1 GATT;
(ii) the WTO Panel report on Canada – Autos held the view that the term
unconditionally does not mean that all conditions are prohibited. Rather,
unconditionally refers, in the Panel’s view, to the notion that MFN
treatment towards another WTO Member shall not be conditional on
reciprocal conduct by that other WTO Member. Thus, conditions that are
non‐discriminatory

across

two

transactions

involving

like

goods

originating in two different WTO Members do not violate Art. I GATT (§§
10.22 and 10.24):

In our view, whether an advantage within the meaning of Article I:1 is accorded
‘unconditionally’ cannot be determined independently of an examination of
whether it involves discrimination between like products of different countries.
…
In this respect, it appears to us that there is an important distinction to be made
between, on the one hand, the issue of whether an advantage within the meaning
of Article I:1 is subject to conditions, and, on the other, whether an advantage,
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once it has been granted to the product of any country, is accorded
‘unconditionally’ to the like product of all other Members. An advantage can be
granted subject to conditions without necessarily implying that it is not accorded
‘unconditionally’ to the like product of other Members. More specifically, the
fact that conditions attached to such an advantage are not related to the imported
product itself does not necessarily imply that such conditions are discriminatory
with respect to the origin of imported products. We therefore do not believe that,
as argued by Japan, the word ‘unconditionally’ in Article I:1 must be interpreted
to mean that making an advantage conditional on criteria not related to the
imported product itself is per se inconsistent with Article I:1, irrespective of
whether and how such criteria relate to the origin of the imported products.

So, whereas the second group of cases understands the term unconditionally in
relative terms (is A requesting from C something it did not request before from
B?), the first string of cases understands the term in absolute terms (A cannot
request anything from B or C when granting an advantage).

As things stand, it seems safe to take the view that no conditions at all can be
legitimately placed when granting tariff advantages, a rather odd view, as we
explain in more detail in Section 5.1.4. However, this is probably one area where
a change in case‐law would not come as complete surprise, given the evolution
of case‐law in other related areas (EC – Tariff Preferences; EC – Asbestos).

5.1.3 The general exceptions (Art. XX GATT)
Art. XX GATT contains a list of measures that can be legitimate exceptions to all
GATT obligations. Case‐law has consistently understood the list of measures
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included in Art. XX GATT to be exhaustive.67 The measures coming under the
purview of this provision are associated with different tests for compliance. No
matter which sub‐paragraph has been invoked though, the WTO Member
concerned must, in accordance with the chapeau of Art. XX GATT, make sure that
its measures:

…are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions
prevail.

Art. XX GATT does not explicitly state the GATT‐obligations to which it is an
exception, but states that “nothing in this agreement” should prevent the
imposition of the listed measures. Case‐law has clarified that it is an exception not
only to trade instruments, but also to domestic instruments: the AB, in its report
on Korea – Various Measures on Beef proceeded to examine whether a Korean
measure (separation of outlets) found to be inconsistent with Art. III.4 GATT,
could still be justified through recourse to Art. XX(d) GATT; later, in its report on
EC – Asbestos, the AB did not exclude the possibility that Art. XX GATT can serve
as legal basis to justify measures found to be inconsistent with Art. III GATT (§
115).

Its title (General Exceptions) leaves, in principle, little room for doubt that the
various paragraphs included in this provision are legal exceptions to the
obligations assumed under the GATT. It should consequently, in light of standing
evidentiary case—law, be incumbent upon the WTO Member invoking this
See, for example, the AB report on US – Shrimp at §157, or more recently the AB report on Brazil –
Retreaded Tyres.
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provision to carry the burden of proof to demonstrate that its measures can
justifiably come under Art. XX GATT. Case‐law has consistently confirmed this
point.

The AB made it clear in US – Shrimp (§ 121), that measures are not inconsistent
with Art. XX GATT merely because of their unilateral character. In the absence of
transfer of sovereignty to the international plane, WTO Members remain free to
unilaterally regulate, provided that they respect the relevant GATT disciplines (§
121). This case‐law has been consistently re‐produced ever since. As a result, it is
now uncontested as a matter of jurisprudential finding, that Art. XX GATT
condones diversity.

The AB has constructed Art. XX GATT akin to a two‐tier test, whereby the legal
benchmark for the substantive conformity of a measure with Art. XX GATT is
provided by the sub‐paragraph invoked, whereas compliance with the chapeau of
Art. XX GATT ensures that a measure is applied in a GATT‐consistent manner.
The AB stated as much in its Report on US – Gasoline (p.22). In its report on US –
Shrimp, the AB provided the rationale for the two‐tier approach in the following
manner (§§ 119 and 120):

The sequence of steps indicated above in the analysis of a claim of justification
under Article XX reflects, not inadvertence or random choice, but rather the
fundamental structure and logic of Article XX. …

The task of interpreting the chapeau so as to prevent the abuse or misuse of the
specific exemptions provided for in Article XX is rendered very difficult, if
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indeed it remains possible at all, where the interpreter (like the Panel in this case)
has not first identified and examined the specific exception threatened with
abuse.

The chapeau thus functions as fixed element that must be added to (and must be
complied with) each and every sub‐paragraph included in Art. XX GATT. The
various sub‐paragraphs of Art. XX GATT, on the other hand, reflect as briefly
stated supra, divergent legal tests that serve as benchmarks in order to evaluate
the consistency of a particular measure: Art. XX(b) GATT requires that measures
be necessary to protect human health, whereas Art. XX(g) GATT requires that
they must relate to the objective pursued. Quoting from the AB report on US –
Gasoline (pp. 17‐18):

… In enumerating the various categories of governmental acts, laws or
regulations which WTO Members may carry out or promulgate in pursuit of
differing legitimate state policies or interests outside the realm of trade
liberalization, Article XX uses different terms in respect of different categories:

ʺnecessaryʺ – in paragraphs (a), (b) and (d);

ʺessentialʺ – in paragraph (j);

ʺrelating toʺ‐ in paragraphs (c), (e) and (g); ʺfor the protection ofʺ – in paragraph
(f); ʺin pursuance ofʺ – in paragraph (h); and ʺinvolvingʺ – in paragraph (i).

It does not seem reasonable to suppose that the WTO Members intended to
require, in respect of each and every category, the same kind or degree of
connection or relationship between the measure under appraisal and the state
interest or policy sought to be promoted or realized.
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Finally, the WTO judge will customarily not put into question the ends sought by
the regulating state, but simply the means committed to this effect. This would
seem to be the natural consequence of the fact that the GATT has been
constructed as a “negative integration”‐type of contract. This understanding of
the scope of judicial review of cases coming under the purview of Art. XX GATT
has been slightly revised in recent years: first in US – Gambling and, more
recently in Brazil – Retreaded Tyres (§ 143), where the AB held that when, for
example, examining whether a measure is necessary to achieve a particular ends,
it:

…begins with an assessment of the ‘relative importance’ of the interests or values
furthered by the challenged measure, and also involves an assessment of other
factors, which will usually include the contribution of the measure to the
realization of the ends pursued by it and the restrictive impact of the measure on
international commerce.

In practice, this means that the AB will be more deferential towards the
regulating state when public health is at stake, and will exercise a more intrusive
judicial review when other ends are being sought. It fell short, nonetheless, of
specifying where the differences in the two tests lie. Environmental protection is
closely related to public health and one might legitimately expect that the
relatively speaking more deferential standard of review in the cases where public
health is at stake, will be applicable also in environmental disputes. This is
indeed the manner in which the AB conducted its review in Brazil – Retreaded
Tyres, a case concerning environmental protection closely associated to public
health.
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Finally, we referred to the AB report on US – Shrimp and, more specifically, to the
holding by the AB that it did not wish to prejudge the question whether there is a
jurisdictional limitation in Art. XX GATT. As things stand, this is very much an
open issue in WTO law: WTO Members can definitely regulate their own
environment; it is uncertain if they can regulate other countries’ environment as
well.

It should, however, be quite easy to demonstrate that WTO Members can
regulate only their own environment and not that of the others. WTO
adjudicating bodies have not discussed what is, in this respect, the basis for the
exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction? The basis, as this paper attempted to show,
can only be the implicit agreement to respect the default rules. Consequently,
states would be legitimately regulating their own environment, and any
transaction that negatively affects it. This would mean that a WTO Member can
legitimately take measures to protect, for example, its own clean air, and also
react against activities by their trading partners which pollute it. The same WTO
Member, however, can never regulate the environment of their trading partners.

5.1.4 A GATT panel’s likely response
As we will try to argue on basis of the discussion in Sections 5.1.1 and 5.1.2, tariff
classifications based on environmental standards can be GATT‐legal. In Scenario
I, B argues that the tariff scheme violates MFN since its exports of EUF x face a
higher tariff than the exports from another country of EF x, and since the EUF
and EF products are like products.68 GATT/WTO case‐law has not addressed

The fact that A has had its schedule certified does not immunize A from legal challenges, as the
AB held in EC – Bananas III, see Mavroidis (2007) pp. 88 – 93.
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head on such cases.69 The closest dispute we can think of is the EC – Tariff
Preferences. In this case, India challenged the consistency of a GSP+ measure
introduced by the EC, whereby the EC reserved an even better (than the
preferential) treatment to imports of textiles originating in countries like Pakistan
that had taken active measures to combat drugs trafficking. The AB,
nevertheless, did not condemn the consistency of a GSP+ measure per se with the
GATT rules; it condemned the challenged measure, merely because the EC had
inserted a closed list of beneficiaries. Had the EC introduced an open list which
relied on non‐discriminatory criteria and standards, the AB would have rejected
India’s claim. The AB said as much in § 188 of its report:

… the Regulation contains no criteria or standards to provide a basis for
distinguishing beneficiaries under the Drug Arrangements from other GSP
beneficiaries. Nor did the European Communities point to any such criteria or
standards anywhere else, despite the Panelʹs request to do so. As such, the
European Communities cannot justify the Regulation under paragraph 2(a),
because it does not provide a basis for establishing whether or not a developing
country qualifies for preferences under the Drug Arrangements. Thus, although
the European Communities claims that the Drug Arrangements are available to all
developing countries that are similarly affected by the drug problem, because the
Regulation does not define the criteria or standards that a developing country
must meet to qualify for preferences under the Drug Arrangements, there is no
basis to determine whether those criteria or standards are discriminatory or not.

Recall that the US – Tuna and US –Shrimp cases dealt with alleged violations of Art. XI, and not
Arts. I and/or II GATT.
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In § 183, the AB uses the term objective criteria in lieu of non‐discriminatory criteria
and standards, without defining it any further:

What is more, the Drug Arrangements themselves do not set out any clear
prerequisites — or objective criteria — that, if met, would allow for other
developing countries that are similarly affected by the drug problem to be
included as beneficiaries under the Drug Arrangements. (emphasis added).

It stems from the above that, had the EC based its GSP+ scheme on objective
criteria (that were non‐discriminatory) it would have escaped the sanction. This
ruling seems to have some implications for what a GATT panel would conclude
in a situation like Scenario I.

First, tariff classifications beyond the 6‐digit level can be legal, as long as any
WTO Member can benefit from the more favorable tariff treatment by fulfilling
clearly specified criteria. We are led to this conclusion, since, in the ABʹs view,
the EC violated its obligations under the GATT, not because of the criteria to
distinguish between several developing countries employed – the drug policies
adopted – but rather because it included a closed list of recipients in its GSP
programme. This made it impossible for other Members of the WTO to profit
from the GSP+ treatment, even if they adopted policies consistent with the
objective criteria established by the EC.

Second, by not evaluating the consistency of the particular criterion – the
adopted drug policies – with the WTO, the AB seems to have taken the position
that Members can freely decide on the basis for a tariff distinction. A fortiori, an
objective criterion such as a difference in the production process (a so called
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PPM70‐distinction) should be regarded as a candidate for legitimate tariff
classifications.71

Third, while the AB seems to be using the term objective as equivalent to non‐
discriminatory (this is the conclusion from the cumulative reading of §§ 183 and
188 cited above), the term objective nonetheless does not significantly help our
understanding of the term de facto discrimination: it seems to exclude cases of de
jure discrimination (such as the closed list employed by the EC), but says little
about the outer boundaries of de facto discrimination. Should, for example, we
understand that a regime conditioning GSP+ preferences in case high
environmental standards have been adopted, de facto discriminates in favour of
beneficiaries who have already adopted policies closer to this standard than the
rest of the WTO Membership? Or would such a measure be accepted because it
establishes an objective criterion according to which trade advantages will be
granted?72

PPM stands for Production Process and Method. The US – Tuna panel report made a number of
commentators take the view that PPM‐based distinctions ran afoul the GATT. There is abundant
literature on this point. We would like to single out some contributions though: Hudec (1998),
(1998a), and (2000) had persuasively made the point that such a construction of the GATT was
untenable and in direct conflict with the negative integration character of the whole edifice. Howse
and Regan (2000) clarified this further, demonstrating that not only on wider policy grounds, but
on simple legal grounds as well, it is not necessarily wrong to condition market access upon the
prior satisfaction of regulatory conditions that amounted to PPM‐requirements.
71 We are not making a policy argument here as to the appropriateness of using such measures.
Policy arguments have been expressed in various places, see, for example, Bhagwati and Mavroidis
(2007). Our point is strictly a legal one: assuming willingness to make such tariff classifications, it
seems to us that the current GATT‐legal framework, as completed through case‐law, is no obstacle.
72 Following the condemnation of its policies by the AB, the EC amended its GSP+ programmes,
and adopted open lists whereby every WTO Member that would accept to ratify environmental,
social conventions, would automatically become a beneficiary country and profit from GSP + tariffs
( see http://europa.eu.scadplus/leg/en/lub/r11020.htm). The consistency of the new EC GSP+ scheme
with the multilateral rules has so far not been tested, however. The absence of challenge does not,
however, amount to ipso facto consistency of the measure with the WTO.
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There are arguments in favour of a cautious approach: the AB found, in Chile –
Alcoholic Beverages, that a tax regime that conditioned the amount of tax paid on
the alcoholic content of the product was in violation of the non‐discrimination
principle, since it conferred an advantage to the countries producing drinks of
low alcoholic content and thus amounts to a de facto discrimination.73 The AB,
essentially held that such a regime favours those countries which produce lower
alcoholic content‐drinks. In this reading, hence, the criterion used cannot be
objective probably because it does not require any change in the policy of the
(potential) beneficiaries.

To conclude, although GATT/WTO case‐law has not addressed the issue under
consideration here head on, it seems that good arguments could be advanced in
favour of the thesis that tariff distinction based on environmental impact can be legal,
and furthermore that the legality does not necessarily hinge on the existence of an
environmental hazard in the importer’s market.74

Note, however, that this case concerns preferential and not ordinary tariffs, such as
those employed in our Scenario I. A crucial distinction between the two sets of
instruments is that tariffs are normally negotiated while preferences are set
unilaterally.75 This distinction is less clear in Scenario I, where the distinction is
introduced unilaterally, but signed off by all parties. The two situations (Scenario
This was of course an Art. I and not an Art. III case, hence, although good arguments can be
advanced in favour of a symmetric approach in Art. I GATT as well, the applicability of this
approach is still very much an open issue. Horn and Mavroidis (2004) take issue with this finding.
The response might change, were panels to adopt a reading of non‐discrimination under Art. I
similar to that adopted in Art. III GATT. This has not happened as yet.
74 Of course, the validity of this conclusion depends on the meaning of the quoted phrase in the AB
report on US – Shrimp concerning the nexus between domestic and international environment.
75 We disregard the notion that developed countries are somehow obliged to give, or to continue
awarding, preferences.
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I, EC – Preferences) are, thus, similar: the instrument is the same (tariffs), and in
both cases the description of the good is made unilaterally (the EC did not use
the HS classification for textiles when conferring benefits depending on the
adoption of drug‐trafficking policies).

One way to discuss the applicability of the findings of the AB report on EC –
Tariff Preferences in the MFN‐context is the following: WTO Members, might
practice two types of tariffs: MFN and preferential. We say might, since there is
no legal obligation to treat developing countries better than developed nations.
Assuming however, a WTO Member imposes a 5% import duty on imports of
textiles from a developing country, while imposing 10% on imports of the like
product originating in developed countries, it must, in principle, impose 5% on
imports of textiles originating in any developing country. WTO Members can,
nevertheless, sub‐divide developing countries, and graduate their tariff
preferences in accordance with objective criteria. This is what the AB held in its
report on EC – Tariff Preferences.

The question then naturally arises whether WTO Members can use objective
criteria in order to distinguish between developed countries. Recall that,
according to Art. 3.3 HS:76

Nothing in this Article shall prevent a Contracting Party from establishing, in its
Customs tariff or statistical nomenclatures, subdivisions classifying goods
beyond the level of the Harmonized system, provided that any such subdivision

As we will see in more detail infra, the HS has been acknowledged as legal context by the AB, that
is, it must be taken into account any time the consistency of a practice with a tariff classification is
concerned.
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is added and coded at a level beyond that of the six‐digit numerical code set out
in the Annex to this Convention….

Assuming thus, willingness to make such distinctions (a rather safe assumption,
since many WTO Members nowadays negotiate at the 8‐digit‐level), how can
such distinctions ever be made without some reference to conditions? Indeed,
even at the inflexible, 6‐digit‐level, classifications often are linked to conditions:
e.g., a 10% on chilled meat, frozen meat could be expressed as a promise to pay
10% ad valorem, if the imported meat is chilled or frozen.77 At the end of the day
the frontiers between conditionality and likeness are blurred: since, as we will see
infra, process based distinctions can make two products unlike as per the case‐
law on domestic instruments, it would be highly irrational to deny that this
should also be the case when recourse to trade instruments is sought. After all,
WTO Members would easily circumvent the prohibition to distinguish through
trade instruments, through recourse to domestic instruments.78 What should
matter is whether the exports from one state are treated worse than the like
exports of another.

There are some other arguments in favour of this approach. It is, for example,
perfectly legitimate for a WTO Member to condition access to its market only
upon prior verification that, for example, a good’s origin is the one declared in its
accompanying documents. Indeed, Art. IX GATT says as much. The question is
thus whether the GATT, as we know it, has taken care of all legitimate concerns

Note, nonetheless, that, whereas the tariff classifications have been multilaterally negotiated and
accepted, determination of objective criteria is a unilateral exercise subject only to judicial review at
the WTO.
78 Recall that process‐based distinctions have been condoned in case‐law in both EC – Asbestos and
US – Shrimp.
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that importing states might have. The advent of the Customs Valuation Agreement
and the Pre‐shipment Inspection Agreements is evidence enough that the original
contract had not done so. The ongoing negotiation on trade facilitation is a
further argument in support of this thesis. If at all, past experience is evidence
that there is no reason to believe that the contract has been completed in this
respect. Importing states might still be willing to condition access upon the
supply of information.

5.1.5 The Default Rules
We have so far discussed the tariff distinctions from the point of view of the
GATT, without taking into account the default rules regarding allocation of
jurisdiction. Does the picture change were they to be taken into account?

It is clear that since the production occurs in B, B has jurisdiction. Whether A also
has jurisdiction depends on whether the environmental hazard is trans‐
boundary, and if so, whether it is direct, substantive and foreseeable. In case it is, A
can regulate, and a tariff distinction between EF‐ and EUF‐products would be
legal, assuming it is GATT‐compatible in other respects. But if the hazard is self‐
contained in B’s market, A cannot, in the name of environmental protection, operate
such a distinction, since its own environment will not be affected.

We have, thus, identified an instance where the default rules would constrain an
EP that would otherwise be permitted under the GATT. It occurs where a
unilateral tariff distinction is made on the basis of an environmental hazard that
does not affect the exporting market in any manner. The default rules would thus
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prevent, in this case, the importing country from regulating the environment of
the exporting country.

A word of caution is warranted here: we are not saying that A cannot exercise
prescriptive jurisdiction in the name of other social values than protection of the
environment; we will discuss policies based on public morals in Section 9. Here
we are making a narrower finding, suggesting that incorporation of the default
rules would lead adjudicating bodies to outlaw tariff distinctions when they are
explicitly aimed to protect environment abroad only.

5.2

Multilaterally Agreed Tariff Distinctions Based on
Environmental Impact

Scenario II: In the tariff negotiations, A makes a tariff promise to import x at 10%
import duty 6‐digit level. Contrary to Scenario I, A and B now also agree to a distinction
at the 8‐digit level between x produced in a EUF manner, facing the 10% duty, and in an
EF manner, imported at 0%. Subsequent to the entry into force of the schedules, B
challenges the classification operated by A, arguing that EUF and EF x are like products,
and that the former should also benefit from 0% import duties in A’s market.

5.2.1 A GATT Panel’s Likely Response
Panels have hardly ever disturbed agreements between WTO Members.79 Recall,
nonetheless, from our analysis supra, that agreements across WTO Members
during the negotiating‐stage do not ipso facto confer legality to the negotiated
material.80 Hence, the panel will discuss whether the two products (EF, EUF) are
like. We are, thus, in this regard effectively in the same situation as in Scenario I.
In order to invoke MFN, B will have to compare the treatment of its exports of
We assume for simplicity that there are no adverse effects on third countries.
The Framework Agreement did not survive the condemnation of the EC bananas policy in EC –
Bananas III.
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EUF x in A’s market to the treatment in A of some other Member’s exports of EF
x. The Panel will then have to determine whether the sub‐classification operated
by A is consistent with Art. 3.3 HS (which is the relevant legal context to the
GATT). We can, of course, only speculate about the response. But were the panel
to incorporate the AB case‐law on EC – Tariff Preferences, it would find support
for an affirmative provided the EF/EUF distinction is based on objective criteria.
81

5.2.2 The Default Rules
The panel will find A at fault, only if the bargaining solution covers the
environmental effect only and the environmental hazard is self‐contained
(limited to B’s market).

6

Domestic EP Distinctions Absent any Trans‐boundary
Externality

As emphasized above, a fundamental feature of the WTO (with the exception of
the TRIPs) is that most border instruments are either negotiated – as in the case
of tariffs – or forbidden – as in the case of quantitative restrictions or export
subsidies. Domestic instruments however, are left to the discretion of the
Members. As a result, the question concerning the allocation of jurisdiction is
significantly more interesting in the latter context: not only MFN, but also NT is
now relevant, and there is more potential for the default rules to have a bite, since
we are no longer in the realm of bargaining solutions. Wewill now investigate a
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Compare Charnovitz (2007).
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series of scenarios involving domestic instruments. In all these scenarios, the
importing countries effectively allege that the exporting country is regulating
environment less than it should.

Let us start the discussion by considering a rather extreme case: one where no
trans‐boundary effect at all from B’s production of EUF x. Extreme as it is, , since
this highlighting in a sharp fashion some of the limits of what can unilaterally be
done:

Scenario III: B exports product y to A. B also produces EUF x, but x is not exported to
A. There are no trans‐boundary externalities (commercial, physical or moral) from the
production of EUF x. But citing the environmental damage in B, A imposes a higher
domestic tax on y than on domestically produced y. B argues that A’s measures violate
Art. III.2 GATT.

6.1

A GATT Panel’s Likely Response

We are by assumption in a situation where the imported product and the
domestic product is the same from a consumer point of view (moral effects will
be considered below), and there is no regulatory need to distinguish the product
either. We will discuss Art. III GATT in more detail in Section 7, let it just suffice
to say here that A has no defense in such a case, against the claim that the higher
tax on a like product violates Art. III.2 GATT. A will, therefore, have to invoke
Art. XX GATT to defend itself. It can choose between Arts. XX(b) and XX(g)
GATT: A will be arguing that its measure is necessary to protect environment or
an exhaustible natural resource (such as clean air, which has been accepted to be
an exhaustible natural resource by the AB in its report on US – Reformulated
Gasoline). It is unclear whether A will prevail or not. It all depends on how we
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should understand the passage in the AB report on US –Shrimp concerning the
nexus between national and international environment to which we referred.
Even if we understand this scenario to be one where this is no “nexus”, in the
terminology of the AB, between A and the environment in B, it is unclear
whether Art. XX(g) would help A. If the AB meant that absent such nexus the
importing state cannot avail itself of the possibilities offered by Art. XX GATT,
then A will lose. If the AB did not construe the nexus as a sine qua non for the
right to regulate, but as a sufficient condition, then for what we know A may
prevail.

6.2

The Default Rules

The scenario assumes a complete lack of trans‐boundary externalities, so there is
no doubt that the default rules would give jurisdiction to B only. Hence, if a panel
took the default rules into account, it would start by noting that only B has
jurisdiction to regulate its own environment. The panel should then observe that
according to the default rules, A does not have jurisdiction over B’s territory, since
there are no trans‐boundary effects that could be leaned upon for the effects
doctrine to be valid. Consequently, the panel should refute a claim for an Art.
XX(b) GATT or Art. XX.(g) GATT exception. More generally, it should not be
possible to use Art. XX GATT as a vehicle to employ otherwise GATT‐illegal
measure to encroach on other countries’ territorial jurisdiction.
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7

Domestic EP Distinctions Based on Trans‐boundary
Pecuniary Externalities

We now turn to a series of scenarios where there are various forms of trans‐
boundary externalities from the lax EP pursued by the exporting country. We
consider in this section a scenario where there is no trans‐boundary physical
environmental hazard, and where there are no moral effects involved either. In
this scenario the lack of an EP in the exporting country affects the importing
country, since the import price is lower (as a result of the lack of environmental
policy in the exporting country). There is, hence, a pecuniary (commercial)
externality stemming from the policy pursued in the exporting country. We start
with this scenario, since this commercial effect will always be present, as long as
B is drawing a production cost advantage from under‐regulating. We will then
consider in the next two sections the impact that trans‐boundary physical or
moral effects (stemming from under‐regulation in the foreign country) can have
in the discussion of this issue. Such effects would exist in addition to the
commercial trans‐boundary effect.

Scenario IV: In the tariff negotiations, A binds the tariff on product x. There are no
externalities from the production of x directly affecting A. A imposes a higher domestic
tax on EUF x, than on its EF‐ counterpart. A produces EF x, and B produces EUF x. B
challenges A’s measure, arguing that it violates Art. III.2 GATT and, that in any event,
it suffered nullification and impairment as a result of A’s practices (Art. XXIII.1b
GATT).
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7.1

Art. III GATT

The NT obligation kicks in once goods have paid their ticket to entry (import
duty) to a specific market. Art. III GATT, which regulates NT, does not contain a
list of specific measures that come under its purview: it exempts two (subsidies,
government procurement), and indicates one (local content). For the rest, it sub‐
divides all domestic instruments in two categories, fiscal instruments (Art. III.2
GATT), and non‐fiscal instruments (Art. III.4 GATT). The over‐arching purpose
of Art. III GATT is that WTO Members do not use domestic measures to treat
imported products so as to afford protection to domestic production.82 Protection
must be always negotiated, so as to ensure that negotiators will continue to have
the incentives to liberalize. Members must not undo through domestic measures
the tariff promises they gave at the negotiating table.

The structure of Art. III GATT, as it applies to fiscal instruments, is as follows
(a) If the domestic and imported products are like;
(b) the latter must not be taxed in excess of the former.
(c) if the domestic and imported products are directly competitive or
substitutable (DCS);
(d) if the two products are not similarly taxed;
(e) then the dissimilar taxation must not operate so as to afford protection to
domestic production.

Central to the scope of the NT‐provision, is the adjudicating bodiesʹ
interpretation of the italicized terms. Case‐law has understood like products to

82

See on this issue, the AB report on Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages at p. 16 (quoted infra).
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be a sub‐set of DCS products, in the sense that, besides being DCS, they must
further share the same tariff classification (usually, at the 6‐digit level). It has
further clarified that it is consumers that will define whether two products are
DCS. As we saw in EC – Asbestos, it is not necessarily the case that a consumer
survey must be conducted for a panel to be persuaded about consumers’
perceptions – in EC – Asbestos the AB inferred itself the perceptions of a
reasonable consumer. Moreover, one does not need to use econometric indicators
to show what consumer perceptions actually are, if seeking to quantify these: in
Korea – Alcoholic Beverages, the AB held that two products can be shown to be
DCS either through econometric‐ or non‐econometric indicators. The latter
comprise elements such as, physical characteristics, end uses, consumer reactions
etc.

A WTO Member that taxes two DCS products in dissimilar manner and above a
de minimis‐threshold (which has not been identified by the AB), is ipso facto
violating its obligations under Art. III.2 GATT. A WTO Member that taxes two
DCS products in dissimilar manner but not above a de minimis‐threshold, is not
necessarily violating its obligations under Art. III.2 GATT: recourse to elements
such as the institutional architecture of the challenged measure will be necessary
in such cases; if the protective nature of the measure is thus established, then
violation of Art. III.2 GATT will also be established (AB, Chile – Alcoholic
Beverages).

Assuming two products are like, any difference in taxation suffices for violation
of Art. III.2 GATT to be established.

With respect to non‐fiscal instruments, the legal discipline is as follows:
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(a) A measure (law, regulation or requirement);
(b) affecting internal sale, offer for sale, purchase, transportation,
distribution or use;
(c) must not afford to the imported like product;
(d) less favourable treatment.

The italicized terms again hold the key to the understanding of the provision. The
term affecting has been interpreted in the widest possible sense so far: there is no
reported case where a measure failed this requirement. The term like in Art. III.4
GATT has been interpreted in similar vein as the term DCS appearing in Art. III.2
GATT. And the term less favourable treatment is understood to be equivalent to the
term so as to afford protection. It is, however, far from obvious how the
interpretation of this term in Art. III.2 GATT (taxation above and below the de
minimis‐threshold) can be of help in the context of Art. III.4 GATT. As already
stated above, the leading case in this field (EC – Asbestos) did not interpret this
term at all.

7.2

A GATT Panel’s Likely Response

We address here the fundamental question of whether a Member is free to decide
on marketing and selling conditions of foreign products into its market, when the
perceived lack of regulation in the exporting market will affect the commercial
terms of imports. In this scenario, we, thus, assume that A does not care about
the environment in B per se, that is, that A does not attempt to justify its tax
scheme on domestic public order (moral values). Art. III.2 GATT is applicable
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since we are dealing here with a domestic tax and not an import tariff. There are
here at least four legal issues that a GATT panel could have to address.

7.2.1 1st Line of Defense: A Restores Equality of Competitive
Conditions
In this scenario, the exporting country invokes Art. III.2 GATT, arguing that the
tax distinction between EUF and EF x is illegal, since the two products are like.
Let us assume for the time being that the panel takes the view that the two
products are like. A will respond that it is treating the two like products in the
same manner: it is subjecting the imported product to a domestic tax for the
protection of environment that it evaded in its country of origin. The response by
A, in other words, is that it is not violating its obligations under Art. III.2 GATT,
since all it does is to restore the equality of competitive conditions by taxing EUF x,
since producers of EF x have taken on costs in order to avoid exposing the
environment to hazards. A would thus argue that it does not afford protection to
its domestic production.83 This raises the fundamental question with regard to
Art. III GATT concerning how to understand the notion “equality of competitive
conditions in the importing market”, which adjudicating bodies have understood
to be the core of the NT obligation?

It is clear that in a situation like this, production of EUF x would give a
commercial advantage to producers in B, since it is not taxed while production of

This line of reasoning has been developed in Horn and Mavroidis (2004) who take the view that it
is consumers that should appreciate likeness, and that there should be no a priori presumption that
government intervention that subjects two like products to a differential tax regime is per se GATT‐
inconsistent. In their view, the current case‐law has made the terms so as to afford protection to
domestic production appearing in Art. III GATT redundant. They deplore this construction, since the
whole purpose of Art. III GATT is to ensure that no protection to domestic production will be
afforded through recourse to domestic instruments.
83
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EUF x is taxed in A. The question, however, is whether this choice by producers
in B suffices as a ground for A to tax EUF x? More generally, how far can an
importing country go in offsetting factors that enhance the competitive advantage of
imported products? This question arises since Art. III.1 GATT refers to measures
that “directly or indirectly” (italics added) confer an advantage to domestic
products. The question is thus how indirect are the effects that this non‐
discrimination provision captures?

The Working Party on Border Tax Adjustments addressed some of these questions,
albeit in a rather unsatisfactory manner since, at the end of the day, the GATT
contracting parties could not agree on this score. But the final report issued by
the Working Party was adopted by the GATT CONTRACTING PARTIES,84 and
should consequently (by virtue of Art. XVI of the Agreement Establishing the
WTO), guide also the WTO judge. In this vein, the WTO judge should note that:

…the Working Party concluded that there was convergence of views to the effect
that taxes directly levied on products were eligible for tax adjustment. Examples
of such taxes comprised specific excise duties, sales taxes and cascade taxes and
the tax on value added. It was agreed that the TVA, regardless of its technical
construction (fractioned collection), was equivalent in this respect to a tax levied
directly – a retail or sales tax. Furthermore, the Working Party concluded that
there was convergence of views to the effect that certain taxes that were not
directly levied on products were not eligible for tax adjustment. Examples of
such taxes comprised social security charges whether on employers or
employees and payroll taxes.85

The term CONTRACTING PARTIES (in block letters) refers to the highest organ of the GATT, the
one enjoying, inter alia, the competence to adopt reports of panels, Working Parties etc.
85 See the Working Party report on Border Tax Adjustments § 14, op. cit.
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The term border tax adjustment is defined in §4 of the report:

… as any fiscal measures which put into effect, in whole or in part, the
destination principle (i.e. which enable exported products to be relieved of some
or all of the tax charged in the exporting country in respect of similar domestic
products sold to consumers on the home market and which enable imported
products sold to consumers to be charged with some or all of the tax charged in
the importing country in respect of similar domestic products).86

The GATT contracting parties took this exercise of determining the coverage of
Art. III.2 GATT quite seriously: the Secretariat was asked to compile a document
where it listed cases of border tax adjustments.87 Nevertheless, beyond the noted
convergence on some taxes, the GATT contracting parties did not agree any
further.88 In sum, this report endorses the destination‐principle, that is, the right of
the importing state to subject imported products to its own laws, for some laws
only.

Following this inconclusive report, trading partners never addressed this issue
again in a meaningful manner. The very rationale of Art. III GATT, however,
argues against an interpretation of this provision in a manner that would make it
possible for importing states to subject imported products to all their laws and

The destination principle, as explained above was taken over from bilateral agreements negotiated
in the 1930s, such as the agreement of 6 May 1936 between the United States and France, see §10 of
the Annex to Working Party report on Border Tax Adjustments, op. cit
87 See GATT Doc. L/3379 of 6 May 1970. See on this score, the excellent analysis in Démaret and
Stewardson (1994).
88 So far, GATT/WTO case‐law has not dealt with cases of indirect taxes, such as payroll taxes.
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regulations affecting the production process.89 The AB acknowledged as much in
Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, where it held (p.16):

… The broad and fundamental purpose of Article III is to avoid protectionism in
the application of internal tax and regulatory measures. More specifically, the
purpose of Article III ‘is to ensure that internal measures not be applied to
imported or domestic products so as to afford protection to domestic production.’
Toward this end, Article III obliges Members of the WTO to provide equality of
competitive conditions for imported products in relation to domestic products.90

So, Art. III GATT is the institutional insurance policy against circumvention of
tariff promises, and nothing beyond that. That is, the term “equality of
competitive conditions” should be viewed in tandem with the overarching
purpose of Art. III GATT to ensure that tariff concessions will not be
circumvented through e.g., domestic taxation. When contracting parties to the
GATT (and now WTO Members) wanted to condemn practices conferring a
trade advantage, they did so by enacting for example, the Antidumping and the
Subsidies Agreements. Art. III GATT cannot thus be viewed as not as an implicit
endorsement for the importing country to counteract any advantages that
exporting firms might enjoy due to e.g. the policies pursued in their home
markets. The very purpose of Art. III GATT is to act as an anti‐circumvention
device, and it should not be interpreted to implicitly endorse the removal of any
competitive advantage that other trading nations enjoy. To repeat our previous
The negotiating history of Art. III GATT lends substantial support to this understanding of the
provision, see Irwin et al. (2008).
90 A note by the GATT Secretariat summarizing the meetings of the Working Party on Border
Adjustments on 18 to 20 June 1968 (GATT Doc. L/3039 of 11 July 1968) captures the same point in the
following terms: “In the case of Article III, the rules were designed to safeguard tariff concessions
and to prevent hidden discrimination.
89
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statement, Art. III GATT is meant to equate conditions of competition within
markets, not across markets. Where precisely we draw the line remains an open
question. But it is clear that Art. III GATT was not designed as a carte blanche for
the importing state to subject imported products to each and every regulatory
requirement applicable directly or even indirectly on its own “like” products.91

What is then the implication for the likely success of a claim under Art. III GATT
in the above scenario? It seems likely that a GATT panel would rule in favour of
the complaining country B. Country A cannot escape an Art. III GATT–allegation
by arguing, that it is removing differences in competitive conditions that stem
from differences in domestic regulations across countries. Such an interpretation
of Art. III GATT is also consonant with one of the underlying purposes of the
GATT‐edifice, which is that all protection is negotiated and not unilaterally
defined.92

If the panel takes the view that the two products are unlike, then its response
would, of course, be that A’s EP is legal. In the present scenario, it is more
probable, however, that the panel will conclude that the products are like.
Assuming a reasonable consumer‐test, as per EC – Asbestos, the panel will
Charnovitz (1994) takes a drastically different view. In his view, WTO Members do not exercise
jurisdiction, as we suggest here, they merely regulate conditions under which imports will take
place. Semantics aside, Charnovitz seems to (at least implicitly) accept that, when a country can
legitimately decide on the conditions under which products will enter its market, irrespective
whether such decisions affect third countries’ interests. In our view, this construction risks undoing
competitive (and comparative) advantages. For instance, if an importing country can legislate that
all products sold in its market must be produced with a least a certain miminum wage, the
importing country could effectively shut out more labor abundant countries from selling in its
market. A similar phenomenon may also arise in the context of environmental regulation.The very
foundation of the GATT edifice however, was liberalization of trade that would take place in the
context of regulatory diversity.
92 This argument is supported by both the negotiating history and the practice of the GATT, as
argued above.
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naturally be led to conclude that, since there is no environmental hazard in the
importing market and no public order‐type of concerns, it is the end‐uses of the
products that would matter most in the eyes of consumers in A’s market. Under
the circumstances, the panel should conclude that A is violating its obligations
under Art. III GATT, since the purpose of this provision is not to equate
competitive conditions across, but within markets.

7.2.2 2nd Line of Defense: A Counteracts B’s Subsidization Through
Lax Environmental Standards
Let us now turn to a different line of defense that the importing state might raise
against an Art. III.2 GATT complaint. Country A may argue that through
differential taxation, it is removing from B’s producers an advantage that they have
been granted by means of a regulatory subsidy in terms of low environmental
standards.93 This is one of the thorniest and most under‐researched areas in
international trade law. The case‐law is so limited and unclear here that we are
reluctant to take a definitive stand on what would be the GATT panel’s verdict.
But there are two reports by WTO adjudicating bodies, the reasoning and the
outcomes of which may suggest that B will prevail.

One of these disputes is US – Lumber IV, which concerned countervailing duties
that the US used to offset alleged subsidies for Canadian exporters.
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The

subsidies were said to arise from favourable commercial terms for the right to

Since the alleged subsidy is in legal terms pecuniary, the importing country would need to
undertake a countervailing duty investigation, and then impose a countervailing duty, rather than
make tax distinctions. But we disregard this fact in order to avoid having to introduce a separate
scenario..
94 Horn and Mavroidis (2007) discuss some of the conceptual and practical problems involved in
defining a subsidy that were highlighted in this dispute. See also Sykes (2003) for a general
discussion concerning the subsidies regulation.
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use a publicly owned production input. Hence, the allegation did not concern a
direct financial payment by the government, but rather a form of under‐taxation
that provided beneficiaries with a commercial advantage. In this dispute, the US
countervailing duties were found to be illegal, partly since the US had not
managed to establish that the terms at which the Canadian firms bought the
input did not reflect commercial considerations only.

The ruling in US – Lumber IV points to a general problem of establishing the
relevant benchmark in disputes where the alleged subsidy is in terms of a
regulator stance, rather than a direct financial payment. How can the
countervailing country establish the situation that would have prevailed, were it
not for the subsidization? If it cannot establish this situation, it cannot compute
the appropriate duties. Consequently, in our Scenario III, it would be a heavy
burden for A to show that there is an under‐regulation of the environment in B
for commercial reasons. B could argue that the low environmental regulation
simply reflects B’s preferences, and that the regulation would be the same
regardless of whether it affected a product in competition with foreign products
or not.

The other dispute of relevance here is US – FSC, where the AB found that the US
was violating the SCM Agreement because it adopted a scheme whereby it
exonerated US companies from their obligation to pay taxes on export income.
The fact that, for example, this was argued to be done in order to remove a
competitive advantage that companies which are nationals of other WTO
Members enjoy (EU Member states, for example, do not tax export income so its
companies do not have to be exempted from any such obligation) was
immaterial.
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In a nutshell, case‐law seems to confirm the impression given by the texts of the
WTO agreements, that that the only subsidies that can be countervailed are
effectively pecuniary. For the rest, WTO Members can freely choose the levels of
regulation (the GATT being a negative integration contract) and see their GATT‐
obligations imposed on a pre‐existing regulatory diversity. Consequently, A
cannot justify its differential taxation on the grounds that it aims to counteract
the regulatory subsidy granted by B to its producers.

7.2.3 3rd Line of Defense: Art. XX GATT Exception
Assuming the defendant invokes Art. XX(b) or Art. XX(g) GATT, our analysis in
Section 6.1 applies here as well.

The issue could be slightly more complicated, if A invokes Art. XX(d) GATT as
defense.95 According to Art. XX(d) GATT, a Member is allowed to an exception
for measures that are

necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement,….

Let us change slightly the example to make such a defense more plausible. The
argument would be as follows: following the negotiation of tariffs, A imposes an
embargo on EUF x – this would be the law referred to in the quote above. A does
not invoke in its law any regulatory objective: A simply states that it regulates
access to its market to its liking. When B complains, it will raise a challenge
This defense could be raised in every scenario where the complaining party has established
violation of a GATT obligation. To avoid unnecessary repetitions, we treat it in extensor only here.
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under Art. XI GATT and prevail; A will defend itself arguing that the imposition
of an import quota is necessary to enforce an otherwise GATT‐consistent
measure of general application (the domestic measure that distinguishes between
EF and EUF products, allowing only the former to be sold in the domestic
market). Can A get away with this defense? The most recent AB report on this
score (Korea – Various Measures on Beef) is not a model of clarity, and
consequently, it is hard to tell how helpful it can be. In this report, the AB found
that a Korean measure separating outlets that sell domestic beef from those that
sell imported beef could not be justified under this provision. Even though (in
the AB’s point of view) Korea genuinely aimed to protect consumers through
this measure, the measure itself was not necessary to achieve the stated objective
in that it modified conditions of competition to the detriment of imported
products. This reasoning is quite clearly wrong (and this is the main reason why
this report is not helpful): any WTO Member can, of course modify conditions of
competition and, assuming it respects the statutory requirements of the relevant
provision of the GATT (I, III, XX etc.), risk at best an NVC96 against it. Assuming,
nevertheless, that the AB sticks to this reasoning, then A loses, since the
modification of conditions of competition (the embargo subsequent to the
negotiations) operates against the imported product.97

Now what if this reasoning is not followed? The outcome will then depend on
the interpretation of the term ”necessary”. In this case, nonetheless, A will have
to explain the rationale for its law. Let us assume that A states that it wants

NVC stands for non‐violation complaint. We discuss this type of legal complain in Section 7.2.4.
There is no comparable case that was adjudicated ever since this one, so it is hard to conclude on
this score. Exporters will be reluctant to negotiate tariff concession with an embargo in place (that
is, if the embargo pre‐dates the tariff negotiation, unless if they believe that the embargo is illegal. In
this case, the importer will either refuse to negotiate or set a very high tariff.
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consumers to consume only EF products. Since some of its consumers value
cheaper goods higher than the protection of environment, absent regulation
consumers will consume EUF products. For A, a total sales ban on EUF products,
irrespective where they have been produced and where the hazard lies, is the
only way to guarantee that its pro‐environment policies will remain intact.
Hence, the measure (trade embargo) is necessary to achieve the objective sought.
Does this defense fly before a WTO panel? This is hard to predict. This could be
one of the instances where there is variance in the result depending on whether
one accounts or not for the default rules. It is not excluded that a typical GATT
panel might find nothing wrong with this line of defense, since the interpretation
of ‘necessary’ will be influenced by the restrictive formulation of the regulatory
objective.98

7.2.4; 4th Line of Defense: NVC
But even if A complies with MFN and NT, B could still have a legal basis for a
claim against A, in that B could raise an NVC against country A. According to
Art. XXIII.1(b) GATT, and Art. 26 DSU, a WTO Member can request
compensation99 for “nullification or impairment” of a benefit due to

…the application by another contracting party of any measure, whether or not it
conflicts with the provisions of this Agreement…

In the 1990 EEC – Oilseeds I dispute, the panel provided its understanding of the
rationale for an NVC (§§ 144 and 148):
Recall our discussion about the relative importance of the regulatory objective in Brazil – Retreaded
Tyres.
99 The form of compensation could vary from monetary compensation to adjustment of the policies
challenged.
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The idea underlying [the provisions of Article XXIII:1(b)] is that the improved
competitive opportunities that can legitimately be expected from a tariff
concession can be frustrated not only by measures proscribed by the General
Agreement but also by measures consistent with that Agreement. In order to
encourage contracting parties to make tariff concessions they must therefore be
given a right of redress when a reciprocal concession is impaired by another
contracting party as a result of the application of any measure, whether or not it
conflicts with the General Agreement.
...
The Panel considered that the main value of a tariff concession is that it provides
an assurance of better market access through improved price competition.
Contracting parties negotiate tariff concessions primarily to obtain that advantage.
They must therefore be assumed to base their tariff negotiations on the expectation
that the price effect of the tariff concessions will not be systematically offset. If no
right of redress were given to them in such a case they would be reluctant to make
tariff concessions and the General Agreement would no longer be useful as a legal
framework for incorporating the results of trade negotiations.

The early cases were dealing exclusively with domestic subsidies that were being
paid to domestic producers, and were undermining the value of tariff
concessions previously made.100

But in the report on EC – Asbestos, the AB had to face an argument advanced by
the EC to the effect that an NVC could not be used against health‐based trade‐
obstructing measures, justified under Art. XX GATT; in the EC view a measure
could not, on the one hand, be explicitly permitted under a GATT provision,
100

See Petersmann (1991), and Mavroidis (2000).
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while the regulating state remains liable for any related damage to its trading
partners interests. The AB dismissed this argument (§§188 and 189). Remarkably,
this case‐law did not limit the realm of possible applications of an NVC to say
those health‐based measures that have a direct impact on the value of
concessions; it is based on the open‐ended language employed in Art. XXIII.1b
GATT. Following this jurisprudence, it seems plausible that NVCs can be raised
against a variety of government measures that might have an impact on the
value of negotiated concessions.

Standing case‐law can be summarized as follows. For a successful NVC, the
trade damage should be suffered as a result of:

(a) a legal practice by another WTO Member; which
(b) occurs after concessions had been agreed; and which
(c) could not have been reasonably expected.

Various commentators have stressed the desirability for strict standards for
NVCs. But there has also been some sympathy for the appropriateness of the
NVC instrument expressed in the literature. Bagwell et al. (2002) have argued, by
endorsing a contractual approach, that trading partners negotiating concessions
during a round should be presumed to morally accept each other, otherwise why
negotiate in the first place? Moral acceptance will be renewed every time a new
round has been successfully concluded. Changes in policy which are not GATT‐
inconsistent and might affect trade could be challenged through NVCs.101
Bagwell et al. (2002) do not put into question the right of the WTO Member
Mavroidis (2004) argues along the same lines but also suggests that some degree of self‐restraint
is warranted: any policy affects at least indirectly and potentially trade.
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granting market access to regulate the conditions under which market access will
take place; they simply state that, assuming such exercise has negative effects on
foreign producers, the regulating state will have to compensate. Consequently,
this approach does not put into question the destination‐principle at all.

In this specific case, it is highly likely that B will prevail. A is not, through this
measure, protecting its environment, and, it is not raising any public order‐type
of concerns either. Consequently, B will find it rather easy to convince the panel
when arguing that it could not have legitimately expected such an action by A,
subsequent to the negotiation of the tariff concession on x.

7.3

The Default Rules

As pointed out above, since the default rules will only be relevant in case there is
no international agreement concerning the pursuit of domestic policies, the
crucial question is how to understand the WTO Agreement; it clearly goes
beyond the restrictions in the text, but how far? In particular, should it be
interpreted to include an acceptance of the commercial effects of unilateral
policies that fulfill the non‐discrimination provisions?

We believe, as argued in Section 4, that the WTO Agreement should be
interpreted to implicitly also cover commercial effects of unilateral policies.
Consequently, the importing country cannot lean upon the default rules in order
to justify its EP. Hence, the verdict would not change it these results were taken
into account by a GATT panel.
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8.

Domestic EP Distinctions Based on Physical Trans‐
Boundary Externalities

In all scenarios in this section, the importing country EP addresses a physical
trans‐boundary externality. The scenarios differ in whether there is a change in
policy.

8.1

Domestic EP Introduced Before Negotiations and Maintained
Thereafter

Scenario V: In the tariff negotiations, A binds the tariff on x. There are externalities
from the production of x directly affecting A. In its domestic taxation, A distinguishes
EF‐ and EUF x, imposing higher taxation of the latter. A practices the same EP before
and after tariff negotiations. The EP provides for a more favourable treatment of the EF
product. B has always been producing EUF products, and claims that A’s environmental
regulation denies it market access.

8.1.1 A GATT Panel’s Likely Response
Depending on the existence of competing products, country B could argue that
the tax differential violates Art. I.1 GATT and/or Art. III.2 GATT. Suppose
country B invokes Art. III.2 GATT, claiming that its export of product EUF x is
taxed in excess of product x when produced locally in an EF manner, despite the
fact that the two products are like. Here, we would be squarely within the realm
of the AB report on EC – Asbestos, provided that consumers would treat the
imported product differently than the domestically produced product upon
purchase. Assuming that an adjudicating body will keep the same standard of
review irrespective of whether the difference in physical characteristics results in
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public health or environmental hazard, it would find that the two products (EF x
and EUF x) are unlike and consequently uphold the tax differential. Note
however, that the legality of the measure would not depend on the trans‐
boundary nature of the environmental hazard. It is because consumers are
concerned with the hazard that the products are not like. In particular, the legality
of the EP would not depend on environmental protection being a legitimate
policy objective.

On the other hand, if consumers would not distinguish between the imported
and locally produced product even if knowing their different environmental
impact, the two products should, by virtue of the reasoning reflected in EC –
Asbestos, be considered like, and the differential taxes imposed would then
violate Art. III.2 GATT. In such a dispute, the importing country would in all
likelihood claim that its measures are consistent with Art. XX GATT. A WTO
adjudicating body would most likely uphold A’s claims under Art. XX(b) GATT,
since A is taking a measure necessary to protect its own environment (by
discouraging imports of EUF products). The question before the panel would be
to what extent the particular measure that is chosen to protect the environment
(the differential taxation) is a necessary measure: the more restrictive the
formulation of the objective (environmental protection), the higher the likelihood
that the panel will uphold the measure, since the court will not be putting into
question the ends sought, but only the means employed to this effect: for
example, if the importing state claims that it is pursuing a zero‐risk scenario, it
can, by virtue of WTO case‐law, legitimately impose an embargo on all sales of
EUF x.
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8.1.2 The Default Rules
In this case, there is no bargaining solution, since A has not scheduled its
domestic policies. The default rules allow A to regulate behaviour by its nationals
in its territory. But under the effects doctrine, A can also regulate behaviour by
foreigners to the extent that such behaviour produces direct, foreseeable, and
substantive effects on its market. It is hence clear that in cases where there is a
environmental hazard from consumption of the imported product (similar to
what was the case in EC – Asbestos), or in case where there is a trans‐boundary
production externality, A can under the default rules lawfully exercise jurisdiction
and decide on the marketing and selling conditions of foreign products into its
market.

How would the outcome be affected if the GATT panel took into account the
default rules? The GATT panel would almost certainly allow A jurisdiction, if
nothing else, due to an Art. XX GATT defense. The imposition of the default rules
would thus in this case not change the outcome.

8.2

Domestic EP Introduced After Negotiations

Scenario VI: In the tariff negotiations, A binds the tariff on x. B produces EUF x. There
are externalities from the production of x directly affecting A. Before and during tariff
negotiations A makes no distinction between EU‐ and EUF x, but, after tariff
negotiations, A introduces a tax on EUF x, and B, who now loses sales as a result, claims
that A’s EP denies B market access that it could rightfully expect under the GATT.

8.2.1 A GATT Panel’s Likely Response
It is by now accepted (US – Gambling, AB) that domestic instruments (public
order) do not have to be scheduled during negotiating rounds, and become
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integral part of the list of concessions that every WTO Member submits at the
end of every successful round. This means that a WTO Member can legitimately
pursue EP at any time, provided, of course, that it respects the non‐
discrimination principles (MFN and NT). A has thus the sovereign right to
unilaterally change its policies and now accept only EF x into its market.

Country B could possibly invoke an NVC. The question would then be whether
B can demonstrate that A’s policies (which undeniably nullify its benefits under
the GATT) could not have been legitimately expected. Judging from case‐law, B
will have an almost impossible hurdle to overcome: it will have to demonstrate
that it could not legitimately expect that A would take measures to protect its
own environment (since the hazard is trans‐boundary in this scenario). One can
safely conclude that the compliant by B will fail.

Let us just for the sake of completeness note that there are in this scenario two
types of commercial externalities: B’s choice of EP exposes A’s producers to
increased competition, and A’s EP worsens the competitive position of B firms.
But the possibility to legally counteract such effects has already been discussed in
Section 7.

8.2.2 The Default Rules
According to the effects doctrine in the default rules, A has the right to exercise
prescriptive jurisdiction, since the environmental hazard is felt within its
territory. Taking these rules into account will hence not affect the outcome, as
long as A is allowed the right by the GATT panel to regulate. In the opposite
case, where A is effectively denied jurisdiction through a successful NVC by B,
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this denial would result from the application of an international agreement, and
the default rules would not apply. Hence, in neither situation will the default rules
have any bite.

8.3

Domestic EP Introduced Before Negotiations, But Abandoned
Thereafter

Scenario VII: B produces EF x. Before and during tariff negotiations A imposes higher
taxation on EUF than on EF x. There are externalities from the production of x directly
affecting A. After tariff negotiations A removes the tax distinction, and B loses sales as a
result. B claims that A’s new environmental regulation denies B market access that it
could rightfully expect under the GATT.

8.3.1 A GATT Panel’s Likely Response
The previous scenario concerned an unexpected introduction of an EP by the
importing country. Here we consider the opposite situation, where it is the
importing country’s removal of an EP that is being challenged. Such a measure
could hurt B if, for instance, B’s firms have invested in a EF technology in order
to get market access into A, and therefore have higher production costs than
necessary to produce the EUF x.

There is, therefore, no violation of the GATT here: country A does not have to
enact domestic laws to protect environment, despite its appurtenance to the
WTO. A can unilaterally take the view that the environmental hazard resulting
from the production/consumption of EUF x is minimal, and unilaterally decide
not internalize the resulting externality through a statute. B could possibly argue
a NVC, but it seems (judging from the general track record with regard to NVCs)
as if the probability for it to be accepted would be rather small.
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8.3.2 The Default Rules
A has jurisdiction to regulate, since it is adversely affected by the environmental
externality. From a legal point of view, A would be perceived to have decided
not to exercise jurisdiction when it abandoned the previous EP. (From an
economic point of view, it exercised jurisdiction by setting a low environmental
standard.) But there is no legal compulsion, under the default rules, for A to set a
certain environmental standard. Hence, the verdict would not change if the
GATT panel were to take the default rules into account.

8.4

Domestic Taxes Introduced to Counteract Lack of EP in
Exporting Market, Even in Absence of Exports

Scenario VIII: B produces EUF x. B does not export EUF x to A. There is a are trans‐
boundary externality from the production of EUF x. A responds by imposing a higher
domestic tax on product y that B exports to its market. B raises two complaints against
A: a violation complaint, arguing that A’s measures violate Art. III.2 GATT, and an
NVC.

8.4.1 A GATT Panel’s Likely Response102
In this scenario, B will make the Art. III.2 GATT‐claim, that A is violating Art.
III.2 GATT by taxing imported y higher than domestic y. A has no defense under
Art. III GATT, and will move into Art. XX GATT to defend itself. It can choose
between Arts. XX(b) and XX(g) GATT. A will argue that the production of EUF x
pollutes its own environment, and, consequently, its measure protects an
exhaustible local natural resource. Its measure certainly relates to the protection

We could have constructed the same example using a trade instrument, say a tariff. The result
would have been the same.
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of exhaustible natural resource, since under this test, all the WTO Member
invoking Art. XX(g) GATT has to show is that its measure is appropriate to reach
the objective sought: A will claim that, by reducing the export income that B
enjoys, it will be forcing B to change its EP. This will be, nevertheless, a novel
issue before a WTO panel: A will be claiming that, in the absence of exports of x
to its market, its measure must necessarily apply on a product other than the one
polluting clean air which, nonetheless, originates in the polluting country. The
panel will, thus, have to decide whether to construct Art. XX(g) GATT in such a
wide manner, or whether it should adopt a narrower understanding of the scope
of this provision, in the sense that the environmental hazard must originate in
the imported y. The text of Art. XX(g) GATT does not exclude the wider
interpretation. The whole spirit of the GATT does not exclude it either: as Horn
and Mavroidis (2004) argue, the quintessence of the GATT is that protection
must always be negotiated. In this vein, the measure adopted by A is not a
protectionist measure. A, acting in accordance with the polluter pays principle,
requests from B to incur the cost of the environmental hazard it causes. Although
we can only speculate about the response, there are good arguments in support
of A’s defense.

8.4.2 The Default Rules
Reliance on the default rules would provide A with an extra argument in the case
where there is a trans‐boundary environmental hazard, since A has the right to
regulate this transaction in light of the physical effects in its own market.
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8.5

Summarizing the Physical Trans‐boundary Externality
Scenarios

We have in the above concluded that in the presence of a physical trans‐
boundary environmental externality affecting the importing country, the GATT
panel will accept the importing country’s EP. If products are considered like
(which is not self‐evident), the importing country is likely to be given jurisdiction
through Art. XX GATT. The prospect for a successful NVC by the importing
country is slim. Imposition of the default rules is not likely to affect the outcome in
any of the scenarios.

9

Domestic EP Distinctions Based on Moral Trans‐
boundary Externalities

We turn in this section to a scenario where there is an environmental externality,
which however, does not physically affect the importing country; it only does so
morally. For instance, an environmental hazard in a country may threaten a plant
that only grows in that country, but its disappearance would not affect the
worldwide ecological equilibrium. Also, the plant lacks any economic or other
value to the importing country, other than the pleasure from knowing that it
exists.103

Scenario IX: A makes EP distinctions based on local environmental effects in B. There
are no physical trans‐boundary environmental externalities. B challenges the measure

We disregard for ease of presentation the possibility that the plant could possibly have some
future use, or that the extinguishing the plant may upset the ecological balance to the determinant
of other countries.
103

111

arguing it violates Art. III GATT. A responds that B’s policies are immoral, at least in
the manner that A defines morality.

9.1

A GATT Panel’s Likely Response

It was pointed out in Section 4 that protection of the environment does not
qualify as jus cogens. But it is still often argued that moral aspects of environment
should serve as a legal basis for tariff discriminations. For instance, there has
been considerable debate whether it is legal and desirable that WTO Members
condition their treatment of imported products on the process and production
methods (PPM) that are employed by exporters to their markets.104 There seems
to be general acceptance today of the notion that EP distinctions based on PPMs
are not necessarily illegal. Indeed, as the analysis in Section 7 also showed, in
case of trans‐boundary physical effects, PPM‐based distinctions could be legal
under the GATT. And to the extent there are substantial, direct and foreseeable
(negative) effects (in case no PPM‐based distinctions have been entered), the
importing countries would have jurisdiction also according to the default rules.

A more contentious question, both from a normative and a legal point of view, is
whether (alleged) moral effects should suffice in the absence of trans‐boundary
physical effects, for a WTO Member to prescribe jurisdiction? The introduction of
morals as a ground for policy distinctions is obviously not uncomplicated. To
start with, it is easy to see that a number of questions concerning evidentiary
standards would immediately arise – for instance, how should the importing

A recent contribution is Pott (2007) who argues in favor of such EP distinctions, discusses the
legality of such distinctions, and suggests ways of making them legal under the WTO. See also
Howse’s (2007) summary of the WTO case‐law relating to PPMs.
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country verify the moral effects from the environmental hazard in the exporting
country? There is also a question of quantification. How strongly must
governments/citizens/consumers feel about the environmental hazard in the
exporting country? Does it suffice that there are a few people who feel very
strongly, or must it be majority?105 We will disregard these issues, however, to
focus on the more fundamental issue of whether a proven, wide‐spread moral
sentiment can serve as a basis for an EP distinction.

The introduction of morals into the equation opens at least three possibilities for
the importing country with regard to the GATT:

(a) The first possibility is to argue that EF x and EUF x (as per our examples so
far) are not like products. The determination by the AB in EC – Asbestos is
often interpreted as opening a door for e.g. PPM‐based distinctions, also in
cases where there are no trans‐boundary physical effects. The idea here is
that this ruling emphasized the importance of consumer perceptions for
likeness. If from a consumer point of view it is wrong to cause
environmental harm, even if the harm does not physically affect the
territory where consumers reside, then consumers would possibly treat
products that cause such harm differently from other products fulfilling
the same needs in other respects. The products would then per the
reasoning in EC – Asbestos not be like, and there could of course not be any
violation of Art. III GATT. As things stand in terms of evolution of case‐

One way to resolve the issue here would be to see what domestic law norms are being violated.
Assuming, for example, that there is a constitutional command against environmental degradation,
one could use this fact as proxy to measure the ‘seriousness’ with which the importing state
addresses this issue. This would hardly be the case if, for example, there is mere best‐endeavours
legislation to avoid the degradation.
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law, we are not entirely convinced that if Scenario VIII captures such a
situation, that A will prevail, even if A can convincingly demonstrate that
consumers view the EF and the EUF products differently106;
(b) The second possibility to bring morals into the picture would be to invoke
Art. XX GATT, and here A could lean against not only Art. XX(b), or
XX(g), but also Art. XX(a), which allows for exceptions “necessary” to
protect public morals.107
(c) The third possibility would be for a WTO Member that totally
disapproves of the moral standards of another WTO Member, to invoke
Art. XIII of the Agreement Establishing the WTO, and, thus, block trade
altogether. This is an extreme measure, but as such leaves no doubt as to
the seriousness of the impact that the moral standards of the previously
importing WTO Member has suffered. On the other hand, a non‐
invocation of Art. XIII of the Agreement Establishing the WTO should not be
equated to absence of moral issues. A WTO Member can, for example,
legitimately take the view that, in presence of Art. XX GATT which allows
it to block trade on moral grounds, it does not need to invoke Art. XIII of
the Agreement Establishing the WTO, especially if the practices it objects to
are confined to specific sectors.

This scenario can be questioned on the grounds that there is no reason to regulate if consumers
would anyway treat products differently. Various counterarguments can be made. For instance,
consumers may not be able to tell one type of product apart from another through inspection.
107 We side with Charnovitz (1998) and his expansive understanding of the term public order,
although not necessarily for the same reasons. We are mindful of Feddersen (1998) who explains
that such view is probably not consonant with the negotiating record. Absent wide construction of
Art. XX(a) GATT though, one risks constructing the GATT as an instrument for de‐regulation
against the clear intent of the negotiators; see Mavroidis (2007).
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No matter what the legal basis is, the importing state would be blocking trade
from partners with which it feels that it does not share the same moral values.
There has been no case‐law discussing this issue head‐on so far. In light however,
of the manner in which WTO adjudicating bodies have recently understood non‐
discrimination, one could predict that, assuming the remaining aspects of the
GATT regulatory framework have been respected, a WTO panel could be
tempted to condone import restrictions based on moral disagreements across
WTO Members. Recall that in EC – Tariff Preferences, the AB made such an inroad
when opening the door to conditioning tariff treatment upon the satisfaction of
unilaterally‐set objective criteria. On the other hand, there are, or at least should
be, a number of very difficult evidentiary issues involved here: for instance, what
if B claims that there is no difference in morals that explains the divergence
between what A would like B to do, and what B actually does, but that this
instead reflects differences in income levels between the two countries? Also,
how should the adjudicating bodies be able to determine whether A’s concern
for B’s environment is what drives the policy, when at the same time it gives rise
to commercial advantages to A firms? We flag such arguments only to show the
slippery slope that we are entering when entertaining moral issues as a
legitimate defense to deviate from the agreed GATT obligations.

9.2

The Default Rules

It is highly unclear what effect it would have to impose the default rules, due to
the complete lack of disputes of this nature. A somewhat mechanical application
of the default rules would lead to the conclusion that the importing country has
jurisdiction, due to the trans‐boundary moral effects from the environmental
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degradation in the exporting country, provided that these effects satisfy the
direct, foreseeable and substantive effects‐requirement.

One might argue that this approach renders the notion of jus cogens irrelevant: if
moral effects in general serve as legitimate bases for jurisdiction, why would
there then be a need to classify certain moral objectives as being important
enough to serve as a legitimate ground for jurisdiction? On the other hand, the
more persuasive arguments lie with the contrary opinion: in case of jus cogens,
there is an obligation to intervene; in case of moral effects which do not come
under the purview of jus cogens, there is discretion. The jury is still out on this
issue.

10. EP Distinctions and MEAs
We will finally consider a couple of scenarios concerning the possibility of using
trade policy to support MEAs concluded outside the WTO.

10.1 Multilaterally Sanctioned EP Distinctions to Induce
Compliance with MEA
We begin by considering the fundamental question whether GATT would allow
the use of EP that violate the GATT as such, if they are used to induce
compliance with an MEA, in a situation where the system of sanctions have been
agreed upon in the MEA.
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Scenario X: A and B conclude an MEA that sanctions the use of tariff or tax increases
by a member when the other member does not fulfill its obligations. A and B are also
Members of the WTO. B violates the MEA, and A responds with a tariff or tax increase
on B products that is sanctioned by the MEA. B complains to the GATT, arguing e.g.
violation of Art. III GATT.

10.1.1 A GATT Panel’s Likely Response
GATT/WTO panels have been quite reluctant to acknowledge the legal validity
of MEAs concluded outside the confines of the WTO. The most recent
pronouncement to this effect is by the cited panel report on EC – Approval and
Marketing of Biotech Products, where the Panel held that, absent unanimous
acceptance by all Members of the WTO, an MEA will have no legal effects within
the WTO legal order. So, if A defends itself under an MEA that has been signed
by some WTO Members only, the panel will examine the measures by A in light
of the obligations that A has assumed under the GATT. In this case, our
discussion of Art. III GATT (since we are dealing here with a domestic
instrument), and Art. XX GATT finds application.

Let us, therefore, for the sake of the argument, assume that all Members of the
WTO are also Members of the MEA. The GATT panel would then, by virtue of
the case‐law on EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, examine the legal
claims in light of the rules included in the MEA. As things stand, we cannot say
for sure whether the MEA will be reviewed as context, subsequent
practice/agreement, other relevant rule of public international law, or, merely,
supplementary means of interpretation. If the latter, recourse to it will, in all
likelihood, be made to support a conclusion already reached through recourse to
other rules. If interpreted as context, its impact will be decisive in the resolution
of the dispute since, the panel will have to use the rules included in the MEA as
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interpretative material to decide on the rights and obligations of the parties to the
dispute. Assuming we stay in this latter scenario, the Panel will have to
pronounce in favour of A, since it will use the rules embedded in the MEA as the
decisive interpretative material to understand the obligations of A and B under
the WTO.

10.1.2 The Default Rules
Assuming we are dealing with a trans‐boundary environmental externality, it is
irrelevant if the MEA has been signed only by A and B, or by the whole WTO
Membership. If the panel were to take account of the default rules, it would
examine the basis for A’s exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction. It would thus be
led to discuss the MEA, which reflects the quest of A and B for a bargaining
solution, to see to what extent A’s actions are consistent with the rules embedded
in the MEA. Since the sanctions are agreed upon in the MEA, the default rules
would not be applicable.

We can, thus, note that trade sanctions that have been agreed upon in an MEA
could be acceptable to both a traditional type of GATT panel, and also be
compatible with the default rules. In both cases the legality would stem from the
fact that the sanctions are agreed upon in the MEA. But a contentious issue for
the GATT panel would be the extent to which the MEA comprises all WTO
Members.
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10.2 Unilateral EP Distinctions to Induce Compliance with
an MEA
Scenario XI: An MEA is concluded between A and B before a GATT negotiation round.
The MEA contains no rules on compliance. A has in place an EP that yields better
treatment to countries that comply with the MEA. A and B then negotiate a new tariff
agreement. Subsequently, B violates the MEA. Following its EP, A then increases its
taxation of imports from B. Faced with a less favourable treatment¸ B challenges the
legality of the EP.

10.2.1 A GATT Panel’s Likely Response
The membership issue discussed in the context of the previous scenario would
arise again. But the EP is different here, since it is now pursued unilaterally. By
assumption, there are no rules in this MEA concerning sanctions for non‐
compliance, so the panel would not accept the EP on the basis of the agreement
in the MEA. We would then effectively be back to one of the scenarios in Sections
7‐9.

10.2.2 The Default Rules
Due to the absence of a bargaining solution concerning the trade sanctions, the
situation would also from a default rules perspective be back to either of the
scenarios in Sections 7‐9.

10.3 Unilateral EP Distinctions Based on Membership of MEA

Scenario XII: A and C conclude an MEA that B does not sign. A increases tariffs on
products exported by B because B refuses to become a member of the MEA. B challenges
the consistency of these measures with GATT rules.
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10.3.1 A GATT Panel’s Likely Response
The distinguishing feature of this scenario is the fact that B is not a member of
the MEA. Hence, any reference to the MEA as being an international agreement
would from the GATT panel’s point of view be irrelevant, since trade restricting
measures cannot be justified through recourse to an instrument that has not been
accepted by the totality of the WTO Members, as per the panel report in EC –
Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products. We would then effectively be back to
one of the scenarios in Sections 7‐9.

10.3.2 The Default Rules
Again, due to the clear absence of a bargaining solution concerning the EP, the
situation would also from a default rules perspective be back to either of the
scenarios in Sections 7‐9.

11. Taking Stock of the Role of Jurisdictional Rules
Environmental hazards very often have trans‐boundary effects, either by
physically or morally affecting other countries, or by directly or indirectly, viaEP,
affecting trade flows. EP are at the same time largely pursued unilaterally. The
general purpose of this study has been to shed light on the international laws
regulating WTO Members’ freedom to pursue such policies. The purpose has,
more particularly, been to provide an overview of the allocation of jurisdiction in
the context of regulation of policies affecting the environment. This allocation is
important since it determines which country has the right to regulate any
particular transaction.
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The starting point of the paper was the observation that in order for a trade
agreement to have any bite at all, it is necessary to have some form of
jurisdictional restrictions on the set of activities that countries can regulate. Two
sets of laws regulate WTO Members in this regard: on the one hand, the WTO
Agreement explicitly regulates how EP can be pursued, and, implicitly, it also
imposes rules on what type of environmental effects that can be addressed; WTO
Members are also bound by the explicit jurisdictional default rules in PIL by
reason of their appurtenance to the international community. These two sets of
laws jointly determine the ambit of unilateral environmental policies for WTO
Members. WTO panels and the AB have not pronounced on the relationship
between the default rules and the WTO Agreement, probably because no claims to
this effect have been made; they have, nevertheless, repeatedly emphasized that
the WTO Agreement must be interpreted in light of the principles of PIL, for
instance, by taking the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties as the legal
framework for treaty interpretation.

In order to structure the discussion, we have focused on a hypothetical case
where there is an environmental hazard associated with the production of an
export product. This hazard can be reduced through the EP pursued by the
exporting country, through actions by the importing country, or through
concerted action by both the exporting and the importing countries. For this
setting, we have discussed how jurisdiction is likely to be implicitly allocated by
a typical GATT panel, that is, a GATT panel that disregards the default rules, and
how explicit recourse to these rules might affect the outcome. Predicting outcome
of hypothetical disputes is never an exact science, and this is perhaps even less so
in the current context. The GATT/WTO case‐law on environmental issues is still
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meager. The situation is even more problematic when it comes to applying the
default rules. Hence, the findings concerning the different scenarios we have
investigated is by necessity highly speculative. But we will nevertheless try to
distil some more general observations.

(1)

A first observation concerns the relation between the WTO Agreement

and the default rules, and follows from the construction of the two sets of law. The
modus operandi of the regulation of goods trade in the WTO Agreement is,
broadly speaking, to allow any measure that has not been explicitly forbidden.
Since these restrictions have been negotiated, and the default rules are not
applicable in cases of an internationally agreed solution, the default rules cannot
reverse a GATT court’s decision to disallow regulation. But policies that are
unilaterally pursued, and legal under the WTO, fall inside the ambit of the rules.

More generally, we can thus summarize the applicability of the default rules as
follows:
Observation 1:
(i) Whenever the GATT (absent default rules) outlaws the importing state’s EP, this
follows from a bargained solution. This is what we have in case of commercial
externalities. In such cases it does not change the outcome if the default rules are
taken into account;
(ii) Whenever the GATT (absent default rules) does not outlaw the importing state’s
EP, it could be due to two reasons:
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a. The GATT explicitly allows the measure.108 The default rules are then not
applicable since there is a bargained solution.
b. The GATT is silent. This is where default rules may have an impact.

(2)

A second set of observations concern the possibility to use EP to address

trans‐boundary externalities related to environmental hazards. In the study we
have discussed three types of externalities:

(a) Commercial externalities: Assume first that there is only a commercial
externality stemming from B’s lax EP that affects A. As we saw in the discussion
of Scenario III, the importing country will here find it hard to get acceptance
from a GATT panel for an environmental policies‐distinction using domestic
instruments. The default rules could not help the importer either. An alternative
for would be for A to use tariffs. There would be a higher likelihood that this
would be accepted by a GATT panel, provided that the policy distinction is made
on the basis of objective criteria, or that it is negotiated. The default rules would in
such a case not hinder A’s regulation either.

(b) Physical externalities: What if, as a result of B’s (limited) EP, there is a physical
externality on A? The possibilities for A to block trade in the name of
environmental protection now look much brighter. In case it employed
negotiated tariff distinctions to this effect, there would be no objection by the
GATT panel, assuming that the criteria are objective, as discussed in the context
of Scenario II. The discussion in Scenarios IV‐V led to the conclusion that a GATT

For instance, protection of environment is a legitimate objective as per Art. 2.2 TBT, and,
consequently, technical regulations which pursue this objective in a TBT‐consistent manner can
never run afoul the multilateral rules)

108
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panel could also be persuaded concerning the legality of the unilateral use of
domestic instruments. The default rules would then confirm A’s jurisdiction. Were
the EP introduced after the conclusion of the negotiation round, an NVC could
be invoked: still, the complainant would find it hard to persuade the panel that it
could not legitimately expect the affected state to react against the pollution of its
environment.

(c) Moral externalities: A substantially more difficult issue is whether the mere fact
that the citizens of country A dislike the lack of EP in B – what we have called
“moral” effects. Such a case was presented in Scenario VIII. It was argued there
that a GATT panel might be persuaded to accept the EP, if consumers in the
importing country see the product as unlike, or if the importing country makes
an Art. XX claim.

What are then our conclusions from the above for the allocation of jurisdiction?
The exporting country clearly always has jurisdiction, both under the WTO
Agreement and the default rules. The question of interest is, hence, whether the
importing country also has jurisdiction. Our results could here be summarized to
say that in general, both the WTO Agreement and the default rules would allow
the importing country jurisdiction when the trans‐boundary effects of the
environmental hazard are physical (or possibly – but here we are simply
guessing – moral), but not when they are commercial only.

At the (substantial) risk of oversimplification, the findings could be summarized
as follows:
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Observation 2:
Unilateral environmental policy
EP conditioned on:
Commercial ext.
Physical ext.
Moral ext.

GATT panel
verdict
Illegal
Legal
Legal?

Jurisdiction
by default rules
Exporter
Both
Exporter?

Negotiated environmental policy
Features of policy:

GATT panel verdict

Jurisdiction by default rules

Objective criteria
Respects membership
Respects MFN, NT, HS, etc
Fails on one of above
counts

Legal

Not applicable

To be judged as
unilateral policy

Not applicable

(3)

We also discussed the possibility for importing country to use EP in order

to enforce its rights under an MEA to which it is a Member. We concluded that a
GATT panel would object to the relevance of any MEA for which some WTO
Members are not members. If the membership issue is not a problem, then any
EP that is negotiated in the MEA would have to respect WTO rules, such as, e.g.
MFN and NT, and be based on objective criteria. The default rules would not be
applicable. Unilateral policies to support MEAs have to be viewed as any
unilateral policy, both from the GATT panel’s point of view, and from the
perspective of the default rules. It thus seems as if the WTO Agreement easily
conflicts with policies that are sanctioned by, or support, MEAs. We summarize
this observation loosely as follows:
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Observation 3
There is scope for conflict between the WTO Agreement and MEAs.

(4)

We have not discussed efficiency aspects of the current regulation of EP in

this study. But it seems straightforward to argue that unilaterally chosen EP are
likely to be inefficient, in the sense of not fulfilling the signatories’ objectives to
the full extent possible, due to a combination of two facts: first, environmental
regulation has to trade off environmental benefits against the costs of the
regulation. The benefits and the costs of any policy are likely to be unevenly
distributed across countries, however. Second, unilateral policy decisions
concerning any type of policy are likely to, more or less, neglect foreign interests,
and there is no strong reason to believe that matters are any different with regard
to unilateral decisions concerning environmental policies.

A globally efficient EP would have to trade off gains against costs across all
countries concerned. The current legal regime, at least superficially, seems to
choose a very different regulatory mode. Through the GATT, it imposes
restrictions on permissible EP that are totally insensitive to the international
distribution of the benefits and costs of regulation, leaving countries with the
right to pursue any unilateral policy as long as it does not violate the non‐
discrimination provisions. It is unclear whether the default rules improve matters
from an efficiency point of view. On the one hand, they cannot override
restrictions imposed by the GATT rules. On the other hand, the rules point to e.g.
international agreements in case of conflict, and they also contain a
reasonableness standard, which may be seen as urging countries to take trans‐
boundary effects into account. But these rules are in a sense softer than those
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concerning e.g. the territoriality principles, and the effects doctrine, so it is
unclear what value they would have.

These conclusions are not meant as a criticism of either GATT/WTO law or the
default rules – it may be that the nature of the incomplete contracting problem is
such that these laws are as reasonable as could be hoped for. Instead, our
conclusion is the conventional conclusion, that there is a need to look for
complementary bargaining solutions for the regulation of environmental hazards
with trans‐boundary effects. It seems as if the current legal regime is not likely to
handle such problems in a desirable manner.

We summarize this final point as follows:

Observation 4:
The WTO Agreement does not allow for any weighting of national interests in the
regulation it imposes on unilateral environmental policies. The default rules possibly go
somewhat in this direction, but their prescription is unclear in this regard.

An

environmental agreement would likely enhance efficiency.

(5)

The most important conclusion in the paper is the following. the very

purpose of the GATT is to harmonize conditions of competition within and not
across markets. Societies make different choices as to the level of taxation, the
level of EP, the level of antitrust enforcement etc. All such choices affect trade,
even if only remotely so. By signing the GATT (and then the WTO), trading
partners accepted to conduct trade on the basis of such differences.
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Observation 5:
Unless we account for Default Rules, we risk interpreting the GATT against its purpose,
which is to serve as a negative integration scheme.
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